## Facts

- Collette Josey Covington was a student at McNeese State University in Louisiana and used a wheelchair due to mobility impairments; she also had a seizure disorder.
- On January 31, 2001, after class, Covington went to McNeese’s student union building, known as the “Old Ranch,” to wait for her arranged transportation.
- Covington attempted to use a women’s restroom in the Old Ranch. The exterior restroom door opening was about 29 5/8 inches wide, less than the 32-inch clear-width standard referenced in the litigation.
- Covington was able to get her wheelchair into the restroom area but could not get the wheelchair into any stall because the stall doors were also too narrow.
- Covington attempted to transfer into a stall without the wheelchair, urinated on herself during the effort, and suffered humiliation.
- While trying to leave, Covington injured herself while struggling with the restroom’s exterior door.
- Covington sued McNeese State University, the State of Louisiana, and the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and comparable Louisiana disability statutes, alleging discrimination through inaccessible facilities.
- Evidence showed that no women’s restroom in the Old Ranch provided wheelchair access into both the restroom and the stalls.
- The Old Ranch had been renovated after the ADA’s enactment, but the renovations did not bring the women’s restrooms into compliance.
- McNeese also lacked a written ADA transition plan addressing how the Old Ranch would be made accessible.
- The trial court granted Covington summary judgment on key liability-related issues, including disability status, lack of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and discrimination. The defendants appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court applied the correct summary-judgment standard, and what effect de novo appellate review has on any claimed error in the trial court’s articulation of that standard.
2. Whether McNeese and the other state defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity against Covington’s Title II ADA claim, or whether they waived immunity by accepting federal funds.
3. Whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Covington was a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA.
4. Whether undisputed evidence that the Old Ranch had no ADA-compliant women’s restrooms (including stall access), along with the absence of a written transition plan and post-ADA alterations, established Title II discrimination as a matter of law.

## Decision

- The Louisiana Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Covington’s favor on the issues presented.
- Any argument that the trial court misstated the summary-judgment standard did not warrant reversal because the court of appeal reviewed the record de novo and applied the correct standard itself.
- The defendants were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; by accepting federal funds, the university waived any such immunity defense for the ADA claim as litigated.
- The record established no genuine factual dispute that Covington was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, given her mobility impairments requiring a wheelchair and her seizure disorder that substantially limited major life activities such as walking.
- The court found no genuine issue of material fact that McNeese discriminated under Title II by failing to provide any accessible women’s restroom in the Old Ranch, a basic facility tied to use of the building and its services, particularly in light of renovations that triggered accessibility obligations.
- The case proceeded only on remaining issues not resolved by the partial summary judgment (such as damages and other relief).

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is proper when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; appellate review of summary judgment is de novo.
- Under Louisiana summary-judgment procedure, when the mover does not bear the burden of proof at trial on an issue (such as an opponent’s affirmative defense), the mover may obtain judgment by showing an absence of factual support for an element of that defense; the non-mover must then produce evidence sufficient to meet its trial burden.
- Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense; a state entity may waive the defense by accepting federal funds conditioned on compliance with federal anti-discrimination law, including disability-discrimination statutes applied in this case.
- Under the ADA, a disability includes a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; substantial limitation of walking supported disability status where medical evidence showed wheelchair dependence and related limitations.
- Title II prohibits disability discrimination by public entities in services, programs, and activities; denial of access to basic facilities (such as restrooms) in a commonly used student-union building can constitute discrimination where access barriers effectively prevent equal use.
- Post-ADA alterations to a facility can trigger accessibility requirements for the altered portions; the absence of a written transition plan may support a finding of noncompliance in evaluating whether access obligations were met.

## Conclusion

Covington v. McNeese State University affirmed partial summary judgment for a wheelchair-using student who was injured and humiliated when she could not use any women’s restroom in the renovated student union due to inaccessible doors and stalls. The court held that the university waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds, that Covington was disabled under the ADA, and that the undisputed lack of any accessible women’s restroom in the Old Ranch established Title II discrimination as a matter of law, leaving damages and further remedies for later proceedings.


Covington v. McNeese State University, 996 So. 2d 667 (2008)