## Facts

- Cox filed a diversity personal-injury action in the District of Maine arising from an accident in Maine.
- Defendant Joseph Quigley was a seaman with the Military Sealift Command who spent most of his time at sea and, when ashore, stayed intermittently with various relatives and others.
- Quigley’s parents lived in Ithaca, New York, at a house on Iradell Road; the home had no room for Quigley, and when he visited he slept on a cot in the basement.
- In June 1988, Cox attempted to serve Quigley at the Iradell Road address; Quigley’s father refused to accept the papers and stated Quigley did not live there.
- Cox then attempted substitute service by leaving the summons and complaint with Quigley’s father at Iradell Road and mailing a copy to that address under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) (now Rule 4(e)(2)).
- Quigley did not appear; the clerk entered default and the court entered default judgment.
- Quigley later moved to vacate the default and default judgment under Rules 55(c) and 60(b), arguing that service was ineffective and the court lacked personal jurisdiction.

## Issues

1. Whether leaving process with a defendant’s parent at the parent’s home satisfies Rule 4(d)(1)’s requirement that substituted service be made at the defendant’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode” when the defendant is transient and does not actually live there.
2. Whether ineffective service deprived the court of personal jurisdiction, requiring vacatur of a resulting default judgment.

## Decision

- The court held that service at Iradell Road was ineffective because the house was not Quigley’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode” within the meaning of Rule 4(d)(1).
- The court ruled that mailing a copy to Iradell Road did not cure the defect where the place of delivery was not an abode and the father refused to accept service.
- Because service was invalid, the court lacked personal jurisdiction when default judgment entered.
- The court vacated the default and default judgment.

## Legal Principles

- Substitute service under Rule 4(d)(1) (now Rule 4(e)(2)) is valid only if process is left at the defendant’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode” with a suitable person residing there.
- The “usual place of abode” requirement is construed to further notice: substituted service must provide a reliable likelihood that timely notice will reach the defendant.
- Administrative or formal ties to an address (e.g., using it for business or relying on a relative there) do not, without actual living arrangements, make it the defendant’s dwelling or usual abode.
- If a defendant has no usual place of abode, substituted service at a relative’s residence is not permitted under the rule; the plaintiff must use personal service or another authorized method.
- A default judgment entered without personal jurisdiction due to ineffective service is void and must be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4).

## Conclusion

The court set aside the default judgment because leaving and mailing process to the defendant’s parents’ home did not satisfy Rule 4’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode” requirement for a transient seaman who did not live there, leaving the court without personal jurisdiction.


Cox v. Quigley, 141 F.R.D. 222 (D. Me. 1992)