## Facts

- Percy L. Crosby created the “Skippy” cartoon character in 1923 and obtained a federal trademark for SKIPPY for cartoons; that trademark later came to be owned by Skippy Inc.
- CPC International sold peanut butter under the SKIPPY brand beginning in 1933 and held a federal registration for SKIPPY for peanut butter and related food products.
- In 1986, Skippy Inc. asserted a right to use and license SKIPPY for food products; CPC sued for trademark infringement and unfair competition.
- The district court issued a 1986 injunction barring Skippy Inc. from (1) licensing SKIPPY in connection with food products and (2) communicating that it had such licensing rights or that CPC lacked rights in SKIPPY for food products.
- In 1997–1998, Skippy Inc. launched the website skippy.com, describing Crosby’s history and sharply criticizing CPC and the earlier litigation; the site also sold “Skippy memorabilia,” included a notice asserting Skippy’s ownership of SKIPPY, and suggested contacting Tibbetts about licensing.
- In 1999, CPC sought contempt, alleging the website violated the 1986 injunction by implying CPC lacked trademark rights in SKIPPY for food products.
- The district court found a violation and ordered removal of roughly ten pages of website material, warning of prospective sanctions of $500 per day for future noncompliance, but did not make detailed findings tying specific statements to the injunction’s prohibitions.
- Skippy Inc. and Tibbetts appealed, challenging the order under Rule 65(d) and the First Amendment.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court’s contempt-based injunction satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) by stating reasons and describing, in reasonable detail, the specific acts restrained or required.
2. Whether the injunction’s breadth, compelling removal of extensive website content that was largely critical and informational, impermissibly burdened protected speech under the First Amendment.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded.
- The court held the order did not comply with Rule 65(d) because it lacked adequate specificity and findings identifying what content violated the 1986 injunction and why wholesale page removal was necessary.
- The court concluded the order’s sweeping suppression of noncommercial commentary and historical narrative raised serious First Amendment concerns and required narrower tailoring focused on demonstrably prohibited representations.

## Legal Principles

- An injunction must state the reasons for issuance and describe in reasonable detail the specific conduct restrained or required; conclusory or vague directives are invalid under Rule 65(d), particularly when enforced through contempt.
- Trademark-based injunctive relief must be narrowly framed to restrain only misleading or infringing conduct; it cannot be used to suppress criticism, commentary, or historical discussion unrelated to consumer confusion.
- Noncommercial, informational, and critical speech generally receives full First Amendment protection; courts must scrutinize orders that restrict such speech and limit relief to what is necessary to enforce adjudicated trademark rights.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit vacated a contempt injunction that required broad deletion of website content because the order failed Rule 65(d)’s specificity requirements and swept too far into protected, largely noncommercial speech, requiring any further relief on remand to be justified by precise findings and narrowly limited to statements that actually contravened the earlier trademark injunction.


CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000)