Craigmire v. State, 1999 WL 508445

Facts

  • Jerry Lee Craigmire was prosecuted in Tennessee as a “habitual criminal” under a state statute that imposed greater punishment if the State proved the defendant had been convicted of a specified number of qualifying prior crimes.
  • Under the statute, the habitual-criminal determination turned on whether the required prior convictions existed and met the statutory requirements; the statute did not make the “nature,” “minor” character, or relative seriousness of those convictions an issue for the jury to decide.
  • At the habitual-criminal phase of trial, the State presented proof of Craigmire’s prior convictions to satisfy the statute’s predicates.
  • During closing argument, defense counsel attempted to argue that Craigmire’s prior convictions were too minor to justify a habitual-criminal conviction.
  • The trial judge stopped that line of argument, concluding it was an invitation for the jury to disregard the law (jury nullification), and warned counsel that continuing could result in contempt.
  • The jury convicted Craigmire of being a habitual criminal.
  • Craigmire appealed, arguing that the trial court’s restriction on closing argument violated his constitutional rights by preventing counsel from making a nullification-based argument.

Issues

  1. Whether a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have counsel argue for jury nullification in closing argument in a habitual-criminal prosecution.
  2. Whether the trial court violates due process or the right to counsel by stopping a closing argument that asks jurors to decline to apply the habitual-criminal statute and by warning counsel about contempt for persisting.

Decision

  • The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Craigmire’s habitual-criminal conviction.
  • The court held that a defendant has no constitutional right to jury nullification and no right to have counsel invite jurors to disregard the court’s instructions on the law.
  • The court held that the trial judge acted within the court’s authority to control closing argument by barring an argument that the statute did not permit the jury to consider (the “minor” nature of the predicate convictions) and by warning counsel not to continue an improper argument.
  • A jury may have the raw power to acquit despite the proof, but that does not create a defendant’s constitutional right to demand a nullification instruction or to present a closing argument urging jurors to ignore the law.
  • Trial courts have authority to regulate closing arguments and may prevent arguments that misstate the law or ask jurors to decide a case on grounds the governing statute does not allow.
  • The right to assistance of counsel protects a defendant’s ability to present lawful defenses and arguments tied to the elements the jury must decide; it does not include a right to ask the jury to violate its oath by refusing to apply the law.
  • Where a habitual-criminal statute makes the existence and statutory qualification of prior convictions the relevant questions, counsel may argue the State failed to prove those elements (for example, identity or proof of conviction), but may not argue the jury should disregard the statute because the priors seem too minor or unfair.

Conclusion

In Craigmire v. State, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed a habitual-criminal conviction and held that the trial judge did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights by stopping closing argument that effectively requested jury nullification and by warning counsel that continuing such an argument could lead to contempt.