## Facts

- Vivian Crespo and Anibal Crespo married in 1984, divorced in 2001, and continued living in separate units of the same two-family house with their three children.
- In 2004, after a dispute involving child support, Vivian filed a domestic-violence complaint alleging current and past verbal and physical abuse.
- The Family Part entered an ex parte temporary restraining order and, after a two-day hearing with testimony from only the parties, entered a final restraining order (FRO) against Anibal.
- The FRO was affirmed on direct appeal.
- Two years later, Anibal moved to vacate the FRO and challenged the constitutionality of New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), including its procedures and standard of proof.
- A different Family Part judge agreed in part, declared the PDVA unconstitutional as to certain procedural aspects and the preponderance standard, and vacated the FRO.
- Vivian and the State appealed; Anibal cross-appealed raising broader constitutional objections.

## Issues

1. Whether the PDVA violates procedural due process by authorizing entry of an FRO based on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
2. Whether the PDVA’s procedures (including the ten-day hearing expectation, limited discovery, and lack of appointed counsel) deny due process.
3. Whether PDVA proceedings require a jury trial, and whether statutory procedural provisions impermissibly intrude on judicial rulemaking in violation of separation of powers.
4. Whether firearm-seizure provisions tied to domestic-violence findings violate the Second Amendment.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division reversed the order declaring the PDVA unconstitutional and vacating the FRO.
- The court upheld the PDVA against the asserted due process, jury-trial, separation-of-powers, and Second Amendment challenges.
- The court reinstated the previously entered FRO.

## Legal Principles

- PDVA restraining-order proceedings are civil and remedial; when the principal relief sought is a restraining order, the constitutional right to a jury trial does not attach.
- The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for entering an FRO in PDVA proceedings satisfies due process because the remedy is protective rather than criminal punishment.
- PDVA procedural features, including prompt hearing expectations, may be administered with judicial discretion (e.g., adjournments when fairness requires) and, in context, provide constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.
- Limitations on discovery and the absence of a right to court-appointed counsel in PDVA proceedings do not, standing alone, render the statutory process fundamentally unfair.
- Firearm restrictions and seizures connected to domestic-violence findings are permissible as reasonable limitations on firearm possession.

## Conclusion

The Appellate Division held that the PDVA’s civil, protective scheme—including use of a preponderance standard, expedited hearing structure subject to judicial control, nonjury adjudication for restraining-order relief, and firearm-related provisions—comports with constitutional requirements, requiring reversal of the trial court’s ruling and reinstatement of the FRO.


Crespo v. Crespo, 408 N.J. Super. 25, 972 A.2d 1169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)