## Facts

- Pennsylvania enacted the Internet Child Pornography Act, authorizing the Attorney General or a district attorney to obtain court orders requiring an ISP to “remove or disable” items alleged to be child pornography accessible through the ISP’s service.
- The application for an order identified the allegedly illegal material by URL and could expose ISPs to criminal liability for noncompliance.
- Evidence showed ISPs’ practical compliance options were limited:
  - DNS blocking generally blocked an entire domain rather than a specific page.
  - IP blocking often blocked multiple sites or pages sharing the same IP address.
  - URL-specific blocking was generally not feasible for most ISPs at the required scale.
- As implemented, compliance commonly resulted in blocking entire domains or IP addresses, preventing access to substantial lawful content along with any illegal material.
- Internet speakers and content providers whose lawful material was blocked often received no notice and had no clear mechanism to challenge the blocking.

## Issues

1. Whether the Act violated the First Amendment by compelling overbroad blocking that suppressed substantial protected speech and failed strict scrutiny.
2. Whether the Act imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint because blocking orders could issue without adequate procedural safeguards for affected speakers.
3. Whether the Act violated procedural due process by failing to provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard to speakers whose content was blocked.
4. Whether the Act violated the dormant Commerce Clause by regulating Internet activity beyond Pennsylvania and burdening interstate and foreign commerce.

## Decision

- The court held the Act unconstitutional on its face and entered declaratory relief.
- The court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act.
- The court found the Act violated the First Amendment because, given available blocking methods, it predictably suppressed a substantial amount of lawful speech and was not the least speech-restrictive means of pursuing the state’s compelling interest.
- The court held the statute functioned as a prior restraint and lacked required procedural protections, including effective notice and timely judicial review for affected speakers.
- The court concluded the statute raised serious due process defects because it did not ensure notice and an opportunity to challenge blocking for non-ISP speakers.
- The court held the statute violated dormant Commerce Clause limits because ISP-level blocking could affect users and content outside Pennsylvania and risk inconsistent state regulation of the Internet.

## Legal Principles

- Laws restricting access to speech, even to target unprotected categories such as child pornography, must be narrowly tailored and may not suppress substantial protected expression as a byproduct.
- A regime that blocks speech through court orders can constitute a prior restraint and must include procedural safeguards sufficient to minimize erroneous suppression of lawful speech.
- When government action effectively disables access to expressive content, procedural due process generally requires meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard for affected speakers.
- State regulation that controls or burdens Internet activity beyond state borders, or creates a risk of inconsistent multi-state regulation, can violate the dormant Commerce Clause.

## Conclusion

The court invalidated Pennsylvania’s ISP blocking statute because the available technical compliance methods predictably blocked large amounts of lawful speech, the order process lacked adequate safeguards for affected speakers, and the law’s effects extended beyond Pennsylvania in a manner prohibited by dormant Commerce Clause principles.


Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Pa. 2004)