## Facts

- Deborah Cullen was hired in 1990 as Director of the Respiratory Therapy Program at Indiana University–Indianapolis, with associate professor rank and a $45,000 salary; she later received tenure (1994) and promotion to full professor (1995).
- Cullen had substantial credentials and experience, performed administrative and scholarly duties, and obtained outside funding for her program.
- The university increased Cullen’s salary in 1997 to keep her paid above a male subordinate; her average annual raises from 1991–1998 exceeded the school’s faculty average.
- In 1998 the university hired Sandy Quillen, a male, as Director of the Physical Therapy Program and tenured associate professor at a $90,000 salary.
- Quillen had extensive academic credentials and was recruited to address a physical therapy program that was on probation and threatened with loss of accreditation; he also was expected to develop a graduate program.
- The physical therapy program was larger and generated far more tuition revenue than the respiratory therapy program.
- After Quillen’s hire, Cullen earned materially less than Quillen each year (approximately $63k–$71k versus $90k–$98k from 1998–2002).
- The university had conducted a pay-equity study predicting expected salaries; the study identified a male–female salary gap and indicated Cullen was paid below her predicted salary.
- Cullen sued alleging Equal Pay Act (EPA) violations and Title VII sex-based pay discrimination; the district court granted summary judgment to the university, and Cullen appealed those two rulings.

## Issues

1. Whether Cullen established an EPA prima facie case by showing she was paid less than a male employee for substantially equal work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions.
2. If an EPA prima facie case existed, whether the university proved the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex.
3. Whether Cullen produced sufficient evidence under Title VII that the salary disparity was intentional sex discrimination, including by identifying a similarly situated male comparator and showing the university’s reasons were pretextual.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the university on the EPA and Title VII sex discrimination claims.
- The court held Cullen failed to show she and Quillen performed substantially equal work for EPA purposes because Quillen’s position involved materially greater and different responsibilities (accreditation crisis management, program expansion, and oversight of a larger revenue-producing program).
- The court also accepted that, even if the jobs were comparable, the university’s explanations—market conditions, Quillen’s credentials, program size/revenue, and the accreditation and graduate-program mandates—qualified as nonsex reasons for higher pay.
- On Title VII, the court concluded Quillen was not a similarly situated comparator given the differences in duties and circumstances.
- The court found no evidence that the university’s stated reasons were a pretext for sex discrimination; generalized statistical results from the pay-equity study did not create a triable issue about discriminatory intent in Cullen’s individual pay decision.

## Legal Principles

- Under the EPA, a plaintiff must show the compared jobs are substantially equal in skill, effort, and responsibility; similar titles or broad categories of academic administration are insufficient when core responsibilities differ.
- Differences in program scope and strategic demands (e.g., accreditation threats, mandated program development, and revenue impact) can defeat an EPA “equal work” showing.
- The EPA permits pay differentials based on factors other than sex, including market-driven salary conditions, higher credentials, and materially greater job demands.
- Under Title VII pay-discrimination claims, the plaintiff must show intentional discrimination; a purported comparator must be similarly situated in material respects.
- An employer avoids Title VII liability when it provides legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the pay decision and the plaintiff cannot produce evidence that those reasons are pretext for sex discrimination.
- Aggregate or generalized statistical pay studies, without a tight connection to the challenged decision, typically do not prove discriminatory intent or pretext in an individual disparate-treatment claim.

## Conclusion

The court upheld summary judgment because Cullen did not show that her position was substantially equal to Quillen’s for EPA purposes and, under Title VII, did not establish a similarly situated comparator or produce evidence that the university’s market- and responsibility-based explanations for Quillen’s higher salary were a cover for sex discrimination.


Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2003)