## Facts

- Scott Lynn Pinholster was convicted in California of two counts of first-degree murder arising from a nighttime burglary-robbery in which two men were beaten and fatally stabbed; the jury imposed the death penalty.
- At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of Pinholster’s history of threatening and violent behavior.
- Defense counsel had consulted a psychiatrist who diagnosed antisocial personality disorder; counsel chose not to present psychiatric testimony and called only Pinholster’s mother in mitigation.
- On state habeas, Pinholster sought relief for ineffective assistance at the penalty phase, submitting additional mitigating materials (records, family declarations, and a new psychiatrist’s opinion diagnosing bipolar and seizure disorders and criticizing the antisocial-personality diagnosis).
- The California Supreme Court twice denied the ineffective-assistance claim by summary orders adjudicating the claim on the merits.
- In federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the district court held an evidentiary hearing, received extensive new mitigating evidence, and granted penalty-phase relief.
- The en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the state court’s decision an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) and relying heavily on the federal hearing evidence.
- The Supreme Court reversed.

## Issues

1. Whether review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.
2. Whether, on the state-court record alone, the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in denying Pinholster’s penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.
- Section 2254(d)(1) review is confined to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits; evidence first developed in federal court cannot be used to show the state decision was unreasonable.
- Applying that limitation, the Court held the California Supreme Court’s denial of the Strickland claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; federal habeas relief was therefore unavailable under § 2254(d)(1).
- The Court emphasized that it did not categorically bar federal evidentiary hearings; rather, new evidence generally cannot be used to satisfy the § 2254(d) threshold.

## Legal Principles

- For claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, AEDPA bars federal habeas relief unless the petitioner satisfies § 2254(d); the assessment under § 2254(d)(1) is made based on the state-court record.
- The “backward-looking” nature of § 2254(d) requires evaluating the reasonableness of the state decision as of the time it was made, not in light of later-developed evidence.
- When an ineffective-assistance claim is reviewed through AEDPA, federal courts apply “double” deference: deference to counsel’s choices under Strickland and to the state court’s adjudication under § 2254(d).
- Under § 2254(d)(1), the question is whether fairminded jurists could disagree about the state court’s application of clearly established federal law; federal courts may not grant relief merely because they would reach a different result on de novo review.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 2254(d)(1) restricts federal habeas review to the state-court record for claims adjudicated on the merits and, on that record, upheld California’s rejection of Pinholster’s penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim, reversing the grant of habeas relief.


Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011)