## Facts

- Gary and Martha Cunningham (the Cunninghams) entered into a contract to purchase real property from Donald and Charolette Jensen (the Jensens).
- After the purchase, the Cunninghams sued the Jensens and their grandson, Arthur Hansen, alleging misrepresentations made to induce the transaction.
- The Jensens and Hansen retained the law firm Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & McCurdy, LLP, including attorneys William McCurdy and J. Nick Crawford (collectively, the attorney defendants), to defend the misrepresentation suit.
- During the real-estate litigation, the Cunninghams sought sanctions and a default judgment, claiming the Jensens, Hansen, and the attorney defendants delayed and stalled the case.
- The Cunninghams alleged litigation misconduct including delayed pleadings and depositions, failures to appear for depositions, refusal to comply with document-production requests, false or perjured testimony and affidavits, noncompliance with discovery orders, and motions and pleadings allegedly filed for delay rather than to advance the case.
- The trial court in the underlying litigation imposed sanctions and awarded attorney fees for discovery-related misconduct but did not enter a default judgment.
- The underlying real-estate case ultimately settled.
- Before settlement, the Cunninghams filed a separate lawsuit against the Jensens, Hansen, McCurdy, Crawford, and the law firm, asserting abuse of process, conspiracy to commit abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), based on the alleged conduct in the first lawsuit.
- The district court dismissed the tort action under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and the Cunninghams appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether allegations that opposing parties and their lawyers delayed litigation, violated discovery obligations, and disobeyed discovery orders state a claim for abuse of process under Idaho law.
2. Whether a conspiracy to commit abuse of process can proceed when the complaint does not state an underlying abuse-of-process tort.
3. Whether alleged litigation misconduct in an existing lawsuit can be “extreme and outrageous” enough to state an IIED claim, particularly where the conduct was subject to sanctions in the underlying case.
4. Whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

## Decision

- The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
- The court held the complaint did not plead facts sufficient to state claims for abuse of process or conspiracy to commit abuse of process.
- The court held the complaint did not plead conduct meeting Idaho’s threshold for IIED, even taking the allegations as true.
- The court treated the alleged delay and discovery misconduct as matters primarily addressed through remedies within the underlying lawsuit, including sanctions.

## Legal Principles

- On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but dismissal is proper when the complaint shows no set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.
- Abuse of process requires (1) an ulterior, improper purpose and (2) a willful act in the use of process that is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding; improper motive alone is not enough.
- Litigation delay, discovery noncompliance, and similar conduct—without a pleaded misuse of “process” in the required sense—generally does not satisfy the “willful act” element for abuse of process and is ordinarily handled through procedural remedies in the case where it occurs.
- Civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action; it depends on a viable underlying tort. If the underlying tort fails, the conspiracy claim fails as well.
- IIED requires conduct that is extreme and outrageous, exceeding all bounds tolerated in a civilized society; conduct that may justify litigation sanctions does not necessarily meet that standard as a matter of law.

## Conclusion

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the Cunninghams’ separate tort suit because the alleged stalling tactics and discovery misconduct in the earlier real-estate litigation, even if sanctionable, did not amount to a legally sufficient abuse-of-process or IIED claim under Idaho law, and the conspiracy claim could not survive without an underlying tort.


Cunningham v. Jensen, 2004 Ida. App. LEXIS 83 (2004)