## Facts

- Michele Curay-Cramer taught English and religion at Ursuline Academy, a private Catholic girls’ school in Wilmington, Delaware, where teachers were expected to teach Catholic religious principles.
- On the 30th anniversary of *Roe v. Wade*, Curay-Cramer signed a newspaper advertisement reaffirming support for “a woman's right to make her own reproductive choices.”
- That same day, the school sponsored a student trip to a pro-life demonstration opposing *Roe*, sharpening the conflict between Curay-Cramer’s public statement and the school’s religious position.
- School officials met with Curay-Cramer, stated her public position conflicted with Catholic doctrine, and indicated termination was being considered.
- Curay-Cramer alleged the school offered continued employment if she publicly disavowed the advertisement and declared herself “pro-life”; she refused and was terminated.
- She sued under Title VII (retaliation and sex discrimination, including pregnancy-discrimination theories tied to abortion) and asserted related state-law tort claims.
- The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Curay-Cramer appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether signing a public advertisement supporting abortion rights constituted “protected activity” under Title VII’s opposition clause for a retaliation claim.
2. Whether Curay-Cramer stated a Title VII disparate-treatment sex discrimination or pregnancy-discrimination claim that could be adjudicated without courts evaluating and comparing violations of Catholic doctrine.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court held Curay-Cramer’s signing of the advertisement was not protected opposition under Title VII because it did not explicitly or implicitly oppose an unlawful employment practice.
- The court held her disparate-treatment and pregnancy-discrimination theories, as pleaded, would require judicial assessment of the relative seriousness of different departures from Catholic doctrine, raising serious First Amendment concerns.
- Applying constitutional-avoidance principles, the court declined to construe Title VII to require such doctrinal comparisons absent clear congressional intent.

## Legal Principles

- Title VII retaliation under the opposition clause requires that the employee’s conduct reasonably convey opposition to an unlawful employment practice; general political or moral advocacy unconnected to employment practices is insufficient.
- Courts avoid statutory interpretations that create serious constitutional questions when Congress has not clearly directed that result.
- Title VII is not construed to require courts to interpret and rank the severity of competing religious teachings in order to decide whether religious discipline was discriminatory, where adjudication would entail intrusive doctrinal inquiry.
- The decision did not adopt a categorical immunity for religious employers from Title VII; it addressed the pleaded theories and the constitutional problems those theories would create.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit upheld dismissal because a public pro-choice advertisement did not constitute Title VII-protected opposition to employment discrimination, and because the pleaded discrimination theories would force courts to evaluate Catholic doctrine and compare alleged doctrinal violations, an inquiry the court avoided absent clear congressional authorization.


Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006)