## Facts

- Robert M. Barefoot, as trustee of a revocable trust, owned a furnished vacation home on a lake in North Carolina.
- Barefoot entered into a written contract to sell the lake house to Thomas and Josephine Curran.
- An addendum to the contract required Barefoot to convey extensive personal property located in the house (including furnishings, linens, window treatments, appliances, dishes, art, and similar items), excluding his clothes and personal items.
- The addendum also required Barefoot to convey all “watercraft” at the lake house (and related accessories) to the Currans.
- On the scheduled closing date, Barefoot refused to tender and convey the lake house and the personal property described in the addendum.
- The Currans sued seeking specific performance of the contract.
- After a bench trial, the trial court found the contract enforceable, reformed it to correct draftsman’s errors and mutual mistakes, found Barefoot repudiated and breached the agreement, and found money damages were not an adequate remedy for the real property.
- The trial court ordered specific performance for the lake house and the personal property listed in the addendum, including the watercraft.
- Barefoot appealed, contending specific performance was improper for a contract involving personal property and that he did not hold title to the watercraft; an affidavit supported the claim that he did not own the watercraft.
- Barefoot also sought post-judgment relief under Rules 59 and 60(b); the trial court denied those motions.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by granting specific performance when Barefoot claimed the Currans failed to show they were ready, willing, and able to close.
2. Whether the contract (including the addendum) was too unclear or ambiguous to support specific performance, even after reformation.
3. Whether specific performance may be ordered for a real-estate sales contract that includes substantial personal property (including watercraft).
4. Whether a decree of specific performance may require Barefoot to convey watercraft that he did not own or could not convey.
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Barefoot’s Rule 59 and Rule 60(b) motions.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of specific performance as to the lake house.
- The court rejected Barefoot’s challenge to the Currans’ readiness, willingness, and ability to perform, concluding the trial court’s findings were supported by competent evidence.
- The court upheld enforcement of the agreement as reformed, concluding the reformed contract reflected the parties’ agreement and was sufficiently definite to enforce.
- The court reversed in part to the extent the judgment required Barefoot to convey watercraft (or other items) that he did not own and therefore could not transfer.
- The case was remanded for modification of the judgment consistent with the limitation that specific performance cannot compel conveyance of property beyond the seller’s title and power to convey.
- The court affirmed the order denying Barefoot’s Rule 59 and Rule 60(b) post-judgment motions.

## Legal Principles

- Specific performance is a standard equitable remedy for breach of a contract to convey real property because land is treated as unique and legal damages may be inadequate.
- A party seeking specific performance must show it was ready, willing, and able to perform and that the failure to close was caused by the opposing party’s breach.
- Absent a “time is of the essence” provision, North Carolina law generally allows a reasonable time after the stated closing date to complete performance.
- A court sitting in equity may reform a written contract to correct draftsman’s errors or mutual mistake so the writing matches the parties’ actual agreement; the contract may then be enforced as reformed if its terms are definite enough to apply.
- Specific performance cannot require a party to convey personal property (including watercraft) the party does not own or cannot transfer.
- Denials of Rule 59 and Rule 60(b) motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion and are affirmed absent a clear showing of arbitrariness or legal error.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals held that specific performance was proper for the sale of the lake house because the contract, as reformed, was enforceable and the Currans were able and willing to perform, but it required the decree to be narrowed because a court cannot order transfer of watercraft or other personal property that Barefoot did not own; the denial of post-judgment relief under Rules 59 and 60(b) was affirmed.


Curran v. Barefoot, 183 N.C. App. 331, 645 S.E.2d 187 (2007)