## Facts

- Michael Nelson Currier was charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on a single alleged theft of a gun safe and its contents.
- Proof of the felon-in-possession charge required introducing Currier’s prior convictions, which risked prejudicing the jury on the burglary and larceny counts.
- Currier and the Commonwealth jointly requested severance: burglary and larceny would be tried first, followed by a separate trial on felon-in-possession.
- In the first trial, Currier was acquitted of burglary and grand larceny.
- Before the second trial, Currier moved to bar retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause, or alternatively to preclude relitigation of facts allegedly resolved by the first acquittals.
- The trial court denied the motions; Currier was convicted in the second trial of felon-in-possession.
- Virginia appellate courts affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant who affirmatively consents to severance into two trials may later invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar the second trial after acquittal in the first.
2. Whether the issue-preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the Commonwealth from relitigating facts in the second trial that were allegedly necessarily decided by the first jury’s acquittals.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed Currier’s felon-in-possession conviction.
- A four-Justice plurality concluded that Currier’s consent to severance permitted the second trial and defeated his Double Jeopardy claim.
- The plurality further reasoned that, even under issue preclusion, Currier did not meet the strict requirement that the first jury necessarily decided a fact essential to conviction in the second case.
- Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds, concluding that Currier failed the issue-preclusion standard without endorsing any reconsideration or narrowing of precedent.
- Four Justices dissented, arguing the first acquittals necessarily rejected Currier’s participation in the underlying theft and should have precluded the second prosecution’s relitigation of that issue.

## Legal Principles

- When a defendant affirmatively requests or consents to severance resulting in multiple trials, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally does not bar the later trial that the defendant agreed to.
- Issue preclusion under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a later prosecution only if conviction would require the government to prevail on a factual issue that the first jury necessarily decided in the defendant’s favor.
- The issue-preclusion standard is demanding: it is not enough that the first acquittal probably rested on a particular factual finding; the record must show it would have been irrational to acquit without deciding that fact for the defendant.

## Conclusion

The Court held that Currier’s consent to two separate trials foreclosed his attempt to use Double Jeopardy to bar the second proceeding, and that the record did not establish that the first jury necessarily decided a fact that would preclude the felon-in-possession prosecution under the Clause’s issue-preclusion doctrine.


Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144 (2018)