## Facts

- Marilee Curto admitted her husband, Charles Curto, to Pekin Manors, a nursing home operated by Illini Manors, Inc.
- Marilee signed the admission contract as “Guardian/Responsible Party” and on a preprinted line for “Legal Representative”; Charles did not sign.
- A separate arbitration agreement required binding arbitration for “any and all disputes arising hereunder” and included a jury-trial waiver; Marilee signed as “Resident Representative,” and Charles did not sign.
- Marilee later sued the facility in both representative and individual capacities, alleging Charles was injured while a resident and later died.
- The complaint included claims under the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act, Wrongful Death Act, Survival Act, and the Family Expense Act.
- Defendants moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, arguing Marilee bound the estate as Charles’s agent and bound herself individually by signing.
- The circuit court denied the motion, finding no basis that Marilee had authority to bind Charles to arbitration and rejecting the claim that marital status created agency.

## Issues

1. Whether an arbitration agreement signed by a spouse as “resident representative” binds a nursing-home resident and the resident’s estate when the resident did not sign and no power of attorney or guardianship authority was shown.
2. Whether the spouse’s signature binds her individual claims, including under the Family Expense Act, where the documents framed her role as representative of the resident.
3. Whether the circuit court erred in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.

## Decision

- The appellate court affirmed the order denying the motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.
- The court held Charles and his estate were not bound because defendants failed to prove Marilee had actual or apparent authority to waive Charles’s right to a judicial forum.
- The court held Marilee was not compelled to arbitrate her individual claims because the agreement did not clearly show she agreed to arbitrate claims asserted in her personal capacity.

## Legal Principles

- Arbitration is contractual: a party may not be required to arbitrate a dispute absent an enforceable agreement to arbitrate that dispute.
- A spouse is not an agent for the other spouse solely by virtue of the marital relationship; agency requires proof of actual or apparent authority derived from the principal.
- Actual authority to execute an arbitration agreement on another’s behalf requires evidence the principal granted such authority (e.g., power of attorney, guardianship, or other authorization); a third party’s preprinted labels are not enough.
- Apparent authority must be based on manifestations by the principal to the third party; it cannot be created solely by the purported agent’s conduct or the facility’s assumptions.
- A waiver of access to the courts and jury trial cannot be imposed on a non-signing resident without proof of authorization to waive those rights.
- A signatory’s execution in a representative capacity does not, without clear language, extend an arbitration clause to the signatory’s personal claims.

## Conclusion

The court declined to compel arbitration because the nursing home did not prove the resident authorized his spouse to agree to arbitration, and the documents did not clearly bind the spouse’s individual statutory claims to arbitration.


Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2010)