## Facts

- Chantal Daigle and Jean‑Guy Tremblay lived together in Quebec for about five months and then separated.
- At separation, Daigle was about 18 weeks pregnant and decided to terminate the pregnancy.
- Tremblay applied in the Quebec Superior Court for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Daigle from obtaining an abortion.
- The Superior Court granted the injunction, accepting that the fetus was a “human being” protected by the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and had a right to life, and also accepting that Tremblay, as a potential father, could seek to prevent the abortion.
- The Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the injunction.
- Daigle appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada (the proceeding is commonly cited in Canada as *Tremblay v. Daigle*), seeking to set aside the injunction.
- Before the Supreme Court rendered judgment, Daigle obtained an abortion in the United States.
- The Supreme Court heard and decided the appeal despite the abortion having already occurred, due to the recurring and time‑sensitive nature of the issues.

## Issues

1. Does a fetus have an enforceable right to life, or legal personality, under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms that can support an injunction preventing an abortion?
2. Does Quebec civil law recognize present, enforceable fetal rights (or juridical personality) sufficient to justify an injunction restraining a pregnant person’s decision to terminate a pregnancy?
3. Does a potential father have a legal right under Quebec law to veto or enjoin a pregnant person’s decision to have an abortion?
4. Can the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms be invoked to support such an injunction in a dispute between private parties?
5. Should the appeal be dismissed as moot because the abortion had already taken place?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously allowed Daigle’s appeal and set aside the interlocutory injunction.
- The Court held that the fetus is not a “human being” within the meaning of the Quebec Charter provision guaranteeing “every human being” a right to life, and the Charter did not confer an enforceable fetal right to life that could be used to stop an abortion.
- The Court held that Quebec civil law did not grant the fetus juridical personality or a present, enforceable right to life; any civil‑law protection of the unborn was limited and typically conditional on live birth.
- The Court held there was no legal basis in Quebec legislation or jurisprudence for a potential father to obtain an injunction to prevent an abortion or to assert a veto over the pregnant person’s decision.
- The Court held the Canadian Charter was not available to support the injunction in this private litigation, absent the necessary governmental action.
- The Court declined to dismiss the case as moot and chose to decide it, given the importance of the issues and the likelihood that similar disputes would otherwise evade timely appellate review.

## Legal Principles

- Under Quebec law, the Quebec Charter’s guarantee of the right to life for “every human being” does not, as written and understood in context, extend enforceable rights to a fetus for the purpose of stopping an abortion.
- Quebec civil law may protect certain interests of the unborn in limited settings (such as property or succession rules), but those protections are conditional and do not amount to full legal personality or a present, enforceable right to life that can ground an injunction against abortion.
- Absent clear legislative authority, a potential father has no right to veto, restrain, or enjoin a pregnant person’s decision to terminate a pregnancy.
- The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms generally applies to governmental action, not purely private disputes; it cannot be used on its own to create fetal rights or to support an injunction in private litigation where the required state involvement is missing.
- A court may decide a case that has become moot where the issue is of public importance and is likely to recur in a way that prevents effective appellate review.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court set aside the injunction because neither the Quebec Charter nor Quebec civil law recognized an enforceable fetal right to life or a paternal veto capable of restraining Daigle’s choice, and the Canadian Charter could not be used to sustain the injunction in private litigation; the Court also exercised its discretion to decide the appeal despite mootness.


Daigle v. Tremblay, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 (1989)