## Facts

- A driver was seriously injured (quadriplegia) when his car was rear-ended by a town police vehicle shortly after he entered a two-lane highway from an intersecting road.
- The parties disputed whether the driver stopped at a yield sign before entering the highway and whether the police vehicle was operated at an excessive speed and in an unsafe manner.
- The driver had a history of right-knee surgeries; he testified his ability to drive was unaffected.
- Medical experts conflicted on whether the knee condition materially limited his ability to use the pedals and brake effectively.
- The town argued the driver violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by failing to report a qualifying physical condition to the motor vehicle commissioner, and the trial court charged the jury that the failure constituted negligence as a matter of law.
- The driver presented an independent eyewitness who described the police vehicle passing in a no-passing zone, returning abruptly to its lane at about 65 mph, and then striking the driver’s car.
- The eyewitness did not report his account until about a year after the crash; on cross-examination, he was questioned using allegations of wrongdoing not resulting in convictions.
- A liability-only jury trial resulted in a verdict finding the town free of fault; the plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by instructing that the driver’s failure to report a physical condition to the motor vehicle commissioner constituted negligence per se in a negligence action.
2. Whether cross-examining a key eyewitness using accusations of misconduct not culminating in convictions was improper and prejudicial, requiring a new trial.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the judgment for the town and ordered a new trial.
- The court held it was error to charge negligence per se based on violation of disability-reporting provisions that function as part of an administrative licensing scheme rather than a tort standard of care owed to other motorists.
- The court held the impeachment of the eyewitness through accusations without convictions violated established evidentiary limits and was prejudicial, given the witness’s importance to the plaintiffs’ theory.
- The combined effect of the erroneous charge and improper cross-examination warranted reversal in the interests of justice.

## Legal Principles

- A statutory violation supports negligence per se only when the statute is intended to protect a defined class from the type of harm suffered and sets a relevant standard of conduct.
- Licensing and administrative reporting requirements generally regulate the relationship between a driver and the licensing authority and do not, by themselves, create a tort duty running to other motorists.
- Impeachment by prior bad acts must comply with evidentiary limits; questioning grounded in mere accusations not resulting in convictions may be improper and, when directed at a central witness, can require a new trial due to unfair prejudice.
- Appellate courts may order a new trial where significant legal and evidentiary errors likely affected the fairness of the liability determination.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial because the jury was improperly instructed that a licensing-related disability-reporting violation constituted negligence per se, and because prejudicial impeachment of the plaintiffs’ key eyewitness through accusations lacking convictions undermined the fairness of the liability verdict.


Dance v. Town of Southampton, 95 A.D.2d 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1983)