## Facts

- David Daniel and David Cabrera drove side-by-side at very high speed on a busy multi-lane highway in Arlington, Texas; multiple witnesses described their conduct as racing and weaving through traffic.
- At an intersection, Jose Reyes-Ramirez attempted an unprotected left turn while oncoming traffic had a green light.
- Cabrera, traveling at an estimated ~80 mph, struck the passenger side of Reyes-Ramirez’s vehicle in the intersection.
- Daniel, still traveling alongside Cabrera into the intersection, swerved around the collision and continued driving without stopping.
- Reyes-Ramirez died; Ruben Escalante, a passenger in Reyes-Ramirez’s vehicle, suffered serious bodily injury including a severely broken pelvis.
- Daniel was charged with two counts of racing on a highway resulting in (1) death and (2) serious bodily injury (second-degree felonies) and was convicted by a jury; punishment was assessed at 12 years’ imprisonment.
- On appeal, Daniel challenged legal sufficiency on causation and argued that Cabrera’s separate manslaughter conviction and Reyes-Ramirez’s left turn defeated Daniel’s criminal responsibility.

## Issues

1. Whether legally sufficient evidence showed Daniel’s participation in the race was a “but-for” cause, either alone or concurrently, of the death and serious bodily injury.
2. Whether legally sufficient evidence showed Daniel’s conduct was a proximate cause of the results, including foreseeability and absence of a superseding intervening cause.
3. Whether Cabrera’s separate manslaughter conviction precluded or displaced Daniel’s criminal liability for the death.
4. Whether Reyes-Ramirez’s unprotected left turn constituted a superseding cause breaking the causal chain.

## Decision

- The court affirmed both convictions and the 12-year sentence.
- The evidence permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Daniel’s racing was a but-for and proximate cause of both the death and the serious bodily injury.
- Cabrera’s manslaughter conviction did not bar Daniel’s liability; more than one actor may be criminally responsible where concurrent causes contribute to the result.
- Reyes-Ramirez’s left turn was not an abnormal, extraordinary event that superseded the causal connection created by the race.

## Legal Principles

- Under Texas Penal Code § 6.04(a), a defendant is criminally responsible for a result that would not have occurred but for his conduct, either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient and the defendant’s conduct clearly insufficient.
- Proximate cause in criminal cases requires that the result be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct; only an abnormal or extraordinary intervening cause breaks causation.
- Participants in a street race may be held criminally responsible for deaths or injuries resulting from the race even if another participant’s vehicle makes the physical impact.
- A co-participant’s separate conviction does not exonerate another participant whose conduct independently satisfies statutory causation.

## Conclusion

The court held that Daniel’s active participation in a high-speed highway race was a foreseeable, substantial contributing factor to the fatal crash and resulting serious injuries, and that neither the victim’s left turn nor the co-racer’s separate manslaughter conviction negated Daniel’s criminal responsibility under Texas concurrent-causation doctrine.


Daniel v. State, 478 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015)