## Facts

- Freda Dapp, a home health aide, visited Doris Larson’s home on a rainy day.
- Larson’s porch and front steps were covered with green all-weather carpeting, and a brown plastic doormat was located near the doorway.
- Dapp entered and later exited the home without noting the doormat’s location.
- While descending the steps, Dapp fell.
- After the fall, Dapp saw the doormat on the ground at the bottom of the stairs/sidewalk.
- Dapp did not testify that she stepped on the mat, tripped over it, or felt it move; she could not identify what caused her fall.
- Dapp sued Larson for premises-liability negligence, alleging the doormat was a dangerous condition that Larson created or of which Larson had notice.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence raised a triable issue that a dangerous condition existed on the premises and was attributable to the homeowner.
2. Whether the evidence raised a triable issue that the alleged condition (the doormat) was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall, rather than speculation among multiple possible causes.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
- The court held plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that a dangerous condition attributable to defendant caused the accident.
- The court further found the record lacked proof that defendant created, or had actual or constructive notice of, any dangerous condition involving the doormat.

## Legal Principles

- In a premises-liability negligence case, a plaintiff must present evidence of a specific dangerous condition and that the condition was a cause in fact and proximate cause of the injury.
- Speculation or conjecture on causation cannot defeat summary judgment; liability cannot rest on guesses where multiple causes are equally plausible.
- A premises owner is not an insurer of safety; liability generally requires proof the owner created the hazard or had actual or constructive notice of the particular condition.
- Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing for summary judgment, the plaintiff must respond with admissible evidence raising a material issue of fact.

## Conclusion

Because the plaintiff could not identify what caused her fall and offered only an after-the-fact inference from the doormat’s later location, the evidence did not show the doormat was more likely than not the cause, nor did it show a dangerous condition created by or known to the homeowner; summary judgment for the defendant was properly granted.


Dapp v. Larson, 240 A.D.2d 918, 659 N.Y.S.2d 130 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1997)