## Facts

- The Islamic Center in Washington, D.C. is owned and operated by an incorporated organization governed by a Board of Governors.
- The Board appointed Dr. Samuel Hamoud as administrator and program planner, with responsibility for secular operations and security.
- On July 11, 1983, the Center hosted an Eid al-Fitr service and reopened after renovations, anticipating attendance beyond the mosque’s capacity; Hamoud arranged private security.
- A newly appointed imam, Dr. Adil Al-Aseer, was to conduct the service.
- A schism existed within the local Muslim community; the former imam, Mohammed Asi, and followers attended and a violent confrontation occurred, including physical attacks on Al-Aseer and Hamoud.
- Hamoud and the private security leader ordered those present to leave peacefully or face arrest.
- Appellants did not leave and were arrested and charged with unlawful entry under D.C. law.
- At trial, defendants contended they did not hear the order due to crowd noise or believed they had a right to remain, relying in part on a religious opinion asserting mosques cannot be controlled to exclude Muslims.
- A jury convicted defendants of unlawful entry; on appeal they raised First Amendment claims, sought a “bona fide belief” instruction, challenged juror substitution, and sought a new trial based on courtroom clerk misconduct.

## Issues

1. Whether applying the unlawful-entry statute to defendants’ conduct at a mosque violated the Free Exercise Clause or Establishment Clause.
2. Whether defendants were entitled to a jury instruction that a bona fide, good-faith belief in a right to remain negated the intent element of unlawful entry.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by replacing a regular juror with an alternate before deliberations.
4. Whether denial of a new trial was an abuse of discretion based on alleged misconduct by the courtroom clerk.

## Decision

- The court affirmed all unlawful-entry convictions.
- Enforcement of a neutral unlawful-entry law against defendants’ refusal to leave did not violate the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses.
- The trial court properly refused the requested bona fide belief instruction because the record did not provide a reasonable, objectively justified basis for believing defendants had lawful authority to remain after being ordered to leave.
- Juror substitution before deliberations was supported by the record and fell within the trial court’s discretion.
- Although the clerk’s conduct was deemed unprofessional, the denial of a new trial was affirmed absent a showing that the conduct affected the verdict or prejudiced defendants.

## Legal Principles

- Unlawful entry requires proof that (1) an authorized person controlled the premises, (2) the defendant was directed to leave, (3) the defendant refused, and (4) the defendant lacked legal authority to remain at the time of the request.
- A bona fide belief may negate the mens rea for unlawful entry only when the claimed belief has some objective justification; a mere assertion of entitlement is insufficient.
- A defendant is entitled to a bona fide belief instruction only when the existence of a reasonable, good-faith belief is genuinely in dispute on the evidence.
- Applying a neutral, generally applicable criminal law to conduct in a religious setting does not violate the First Amendment when the prosecution addresses secular conduct rather than theological questions or religious doctrine.
- Pre-deliberation juror substitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion and generally requires factual support for dismissal and a showing of prejudice for reversal.
- Denial of a new trial based on courtroom staff misconduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion; reversal requires a showing of prejudice affecting substantial rights.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the unlawful-entry convictions arising from defendants’ refusal to leave the Islamic Center after an authorized order, holding that the First Amendment did not bar prosecution for secular misconduct and that a bona fide belief defense requires an objectively reasonable basis before a jury instruction is warranted; it also found no reversible error in juror substitution or the denial of a new trial for clerk misconduct.


Darab v. United States, 623 A.2d 127 (D.C. 1993)