## Facts

- Washington law permitted public-sector “agency shop” arrangements requiring nonunion employees to pay agency fees through payroll deductions to support collective bargaining.
- Prior federal precedent allowed agency fees for bargaining-related costs but barred using objecting nonmembers’ fees for ideological or political activities unrelated to bargaining, subject to procedural protections.
- Washington voters enacted RCW 42.17.760 (§ 760), requiring a public-sector union to obtain a nonmember’s affirmative authorization before using that nonmember’s agency fees for “election-related purposes.”
- The Washington Education Association (WEA) collected agency fees and funded election-related activities without obtaining affirmative authorizations from nonmembers.
- The State of Washington sued WEA for violating § 760; the trial court found a violation and entered monetary and injunctive relief.
- Nonmember employees (including Davenport) filed a class action against WEA; the trial court found § 760 supported a private right of action and certified a class, staying proceedings pending appeal.
- The Washington Supreme Court held that nonmember silence after receiving notice did not satisfy § 760, but concluded § 760’s affirmative-authorization requirement violated the First Amendment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring a public-sector union to obtain a nonmember’s affirmative authorization before using that nonmember’s agency fees for election-related purposes.
2. Whether prior agency-fee decisions constitutionally require an opt-out regime (placing the burden on objecting nonmembers) rather than permitting an opt-in requirement for election-related spending.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court and upheld § 760.
- The Court held that requiring affirmative authorization from nonmembers before using their agency fees for election-related purposes does not violate the First Amendment.
- The Court reasoned that agency-fee collection from nonmembers is a state-conferred power; because the State could restrict agency fees more sharply or eliminate them, it may impose this lesser condition.
- The Court rejected the claim that earlier agency-fee cases constitutionalized an opt-out system or required “balancing” that favors unions’ access to nonmember funds.
- The Court treated § 760 as regulating the union’s use of funds taken from nonmembers under a state-created arrangement, not as a direct restriction on the union’s political speech using its own funds.
- The Court characterized § 760 as viewpoint neutral because it applied to election-related uses of nonmember fees without regard to the union’s political position.

## Legal Principles

- Public-sector unions have no constitutional entitlement to collect agency fees from nonmembers; such authority exists only by state authorization.
- A State may condition a union’s use of nonmember agency fees for election-related purposes on the nonmember’s affirmative consent.
- Prior agency-fee precedents set limits on compelled financial support and require procedures for objectors, but do not mandate that states adopt an opt-out default for political or electoral expenditures.
- A regulation aimed at controlling access to and use of nonmembers’ compelled fees for electoral activity, applied without regard to viewpoint, is not treated as viewpoint discrimination against the union’s speech.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that Washington’s opt-in requirement for using nonmembers’ agency fees in election-related spending is a constitutional, viewpoint-neutral condition on a state-created authority to collect and spend nonmembers’ money, and the First Amendment does not require an opt-out regime for such expenditures.


Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007)