Facts
- Washington law permitted public-sector “agency shop” arrangements requiring nonunion employees to pay agency fees through payroll deductions to support collective bargaining.
- Prior federal precedent allowed agency fees for bargaining-related costs but barred using objecting nonmembers’ fees for ideological or political activities unrelated to bargaining, subject to procedural protections.
- Washington voters enacted RCW 42.17.760 (§ 760), requiring a public-sector union to obtain a nonmember’s affirmative authorization before using that nonmember’s agency fees for “election-related purposes.”
- The Washington Education Association (WEA) collected agency fees and funded election-related activities without obtaining affirmative authorizations from nonmembers.
- The State of Washington sued WEA for violating § 760; the trial court found a violation and entered monetary and injunctive relief.
- Nonmember employees (including Davenport) filed a class action against WEA; the trial court found § 760 supported a private right of action and certified a class, staying proceedings pending appeal.
- The Washington Supreme Court held that nonmember silence after receiving notice did not satisfy § 760, but concluded § 760’s affirmative-authorization requirement violated the First Amendment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
- Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring a public-sector union to obtain a nonmember’s affirmative authorization before using that nonmember’s agency fees for election-related purposes.
- Whether prior agency-fee decisions constitutionally require an opt-out regime (placing the burden on objecting nonmembers) rather than permitting an opt-in requirement for election-related spending.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court and upheld § 760.
- The Court held that requiring affirmative authorization from nonmembers before using their agency fees for election-related purposes does not violate the First Amendment.
- The Court reasoned that agency-fee collection from nonmembers is a state-conferred power; because the State could restrict agency fees more sharply or eliminate them, it may impose this lesser condition.
- The Court rejected the claim that earlier agency-fee cases constitutionalized an opt-out system or required “balancing” that favors unions’ access to nonmember funds.
- The Court treated § 760 as regulating the union’s use of funds taken from nonmembers under a state-created arrangement, not as a direct restriction on the union’s political speech using its own funds.
- The Court characterized § 760 as viewpoint neutral because it applied to election-related uses of nonmember fees without regard to the union’s political position.
Legal Principles
- Public-sector unions have no constitutional entitlement to collect agency fees from nonmembers; such authority exists only by state authorization.
- A State may condition a union’s use of nonmember agency fees for election-related purposes on the nonmember’s affirmative consent.
- Prior agency-fee precedents set limits on compelled financial support and require procedures for objectors, but do not mandate that states adopt an opt-out default for political or electoral expenditures.
- A regulation aimed at controlling access to and use of nonmembers’ compelled fees for electoral activity, applied without regard to viewpoint, is not treated as viewpoint discrimination against the union’s speech.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that Washington’s opt-in requirement for using nonmembers’ agency fees in election-related spending is a constitutional, viewpoint-neutral condition on a state-created authority to collect and spend nonmembers’ money, and the First Amendment does not require an opt-out regime for such expenditures.