## Facts

- Solomon spoke to third parties, stating he could prove that Isabella Davies (a married woman) had sexual “connection” with a man named Labrach.
- Solomon added he would rather have his tongue cut out than separate husband and wife.
- The statement was alleged to have caused John Davies to separate from Isabella.
- The statement was also alleged to have caused Isabella’s friends to stop speaking to her.
- John Davies and Isabella Davies sued for slander (procedurally brought in both their names), pleading reputational injury and special damage.
- Solomon challenged the pleading by demurrer, asserting the declaration disclosed no cause of action even if its allegations were true.

## Issues

1. Whether words imputing adultery to a married woman are actionable in slander without proof of special damage.
2. If special damage is required, whether allegations that the slander caused marital separation and social ostracism are sufficient special damage.
3. Whether the speaker’s qualifying statement expressing reluctance to separate the couple negates or neutralizes the defamatory imputation.

## Decision

- The court overruled the demurrer and held the declaration legally sufficient.
- The alleged statement imputing adultery was defamatory and capable of supporting a slander action.
- The pleaded consequences—husband’s separation and friends ceasing association—were sufficient special damage.
- The qualifying remark about not wishing to separate the spouses did not cure or retract the charge and did not defeat actionability.
- The action was allowed to proceed; the ruling did not resolve ultimate liability or damages at trial.

## Legal Principles

- A slander claim may proceed where the plaintiff pleads and proves special damage if the words are not actionable per se.
- Marital separation attributable to defamatory words can constitute special damage.
- Loss of social relations and resulting tangible social harm attributable to slander can constitute special damage.
- Words must be read as a whole, but a statement of reluctance or purported good intention does not negate an asserted defamatory imputation of fact.

## Conclusion

The court held that an allegation of a married woman’s adultery, coupled with pleaded marital separation and social ostracism caused by the statement, stated a valid slander claim, and that a speaker’s professed reluctance to disrupt the marriage did not neutralize the defamatory accusation.


Davies & Wife v. Solomon, L.R. 7 Q.B. 112 (Q.B. 1871)