## Facts

- Junior Lewis Davis and Mary Sue Davis, an infertile married couple, underwent IVF treatment at a Knoxville clinic.
- In December 1988, nine ova were retrieved from Mary Sue and fertilized; after transfer of two embryos failed, seven preembryos were cryopreserved.
- The parties had no prior agreement governing disposition of the cryopreserved preembryos in the event of divorce.
- Junior filed for divorce in February 1989; the parties resolved all matters except disposition of the seven cryopreserved preembryos.
- Mary Sue initially sought to use the preembryos to attempt pregnancy; after both parties later remarried, she instead sought to donate them to another infertile couple.
- Junior objected to any disposition that could result in his genetic offspring being born.

## Issues

1. How should cryopreserved preembryos created through IVF be legally classified: as persons, property, or a distinct category?
2. When genetic progenitors disagree and there is no controlling prior agreement, what standard governs disposition of the preembryos?
3. In a dispute between donation for possible gestation and an objection based on avoiding genetic parenthood, whose interests control?

## Decision

- The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s determination that the preembryos were “human beings” subject to a custody/best-interests analysis.
- The court held that preembryos are neither legal persons nor ordinary property; they occupy an interim category deserving “special respect” due to their potential for human life.
- The court adopted a dispute-resolution framework prioritizing: (1) contemporaneous preferences of the progenitors, (2) enforcement of any prior disposition agreement, and (3) if no agreement exists, balancing the parties’ interests.
- Applying that framework, the court held Junior’s interest in avoiding procreation outweighed Mary Sue’s interest in donating the preembryos to another couple.
- The court’s disposition effectively prevented use of the preembryos for reproduction over Junior’s objection.

## Legal Principles

- Cryopreserved preembryos are not “persons” with full legal rights, and disputes over them should not be resolved using child-custody or best-interests standards.
- Preembryos are not mere chattels; they occupy an interim status that warrants special respect because of their potential for human life.
- Procreational autonomy includes both the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.
- Any prior agreement between genetic progenitors regarding disposition of preembryos is presumed valid and generally enforceable, subject to ordinary contract defenses and public-policy limits.
- When no agreement exists, courts should weigh the parties’ competing interests; in most cases, the interest in avoiding procreation should prevail, particularly when the other party seeks only donation rather than personal gestation.
- The state’s interest in potential life at the preimplantation stage is insufficient, standing alone, to override the progenitors’ procreational autonomy.

## Conclusion

The Tennessee Supreme Court treated IVF preembryos as a special interim category and held that, absent a controlling agreement, courts must balance the parties’ interests, generally favoring the party seeking to avoid genetic parenthood; on these facts, the objecting spouse prevailed over a request to donate the preembryos for potential gestation.


Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)