## Facts

- In 1991, Virginia Cope executed a mineral deed conveying mineral-related interests to JD Minerals using a printed form with ten tract references described generally by acreage and unit names rather than precise legal descriptions.
- The 1991 deed included a “further assurances” provision requiring the grantor to sign supplemental instruments for a more complete or accurate description if requested.
- The deed also contained (1) a Mother Hubbard clause covering adjacent/contiguous strips and correcting description errors, and (2) a general granting clause conveying “all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty interest owned by Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not same is herein above correctly described.”
- A second 1991 deed from James Hammond Mills to Davis used materially identical language and similarly imprecise tract descriptions.
- In 2011, the same grantors (or successors) purported to convey to Mark Mueller the same Harrison County mineral interests previously conveyed to Davis.
- Mueller sued to quiet title, alleging the 1991 deeds failed the Statute of Frauds because the tract descriptions did not identify the property with reasonable certainty and the general grant could not cure the defect.
- The trial court granted Davis summary judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment against Mueller.
- The court of appeals reversed, concluding the general grant was ambiguous in context and fact issues remained.
- The Supreme Court of Texas granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether a deed satisfies the Statute of Frauds’ “reasonable certainty” requirement when specific tract descriptions are vague but the deed also contains a general grant conveying all of the grantor’s mineral-related interests in a named county.
2. Whether a Mother Hubbard clause, and the placement of a countywide general grant near it, makes the general grant ambiguous so that its scope cannot be determined as a matter of law.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment that Mueller take nothing.
- The Court held the countywide general granting clauses were unambiguous and effective.
- The Court concluded the 1991 deeds validly conveyed all of the grantors’ mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty interests in Harrison County to Davis, despite the vagueness of the listed tract descriptions.
- Because the general grant was unambiguous, deed construction was a question of law and summary judgment for Davis was proper.

## Legal Principles

- For real-property conveyances, the Statute of Frauds requires a signed writing that supplies, within itself or by reference to another existing writing, the means to identify the land with reasonable certainty.
- Texas law gives effect to a general conveyance of all property of a specified type owned by the grantor within a defined geographic area (including a county), and such a clause may enlarge or supersede accompanying specific descriptions.
- A Mother Hubbard clause (capturing small adjacent/omitted strips and correcting minor description errors) does not, by itself, narrow or create ambiguity in an otherwise clear countywide “all interests owned” general grant.
- Contract and deed interpretation canons disfavour constructions that render language redundant; a clear general granting clause should be given independent operative effect rather than reduced to duplicating a Mother Hubbard clause.
- If the deed language is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is unnecessary and summary judgment may resolve title as a matter of law.

## Conclusion

The Texas Supreme Court held that a clear countywide general granting clause conveying all mineral-related interests owned by the grantor in a named county satisfies the Statute of Frauds and is not rendered ambiguous by accompanying imprecise tract references or a Mother Hubbard clause; therefore, the later grantee could not establish superior title and took nothing.


Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. 2017)