## Facts

- Gail Davis worked as Diana Ross’s executive assistant from about January 1982 until early November 1982.
- Davis alleged she performed competently, that Ross appreciated her work, and that Davis voluntarily resigned.
- On October 11, 1983, Ross wrote and distributed a letter listing seven named individuals, including Davis, stating they were no longer in her employment.
- The letter added: “If I let an employee go, it’s because either their work or their personal habits are not acceptable to me. I do not recommend these people. In fact, if you hear from these people, and they use my name as a reference, I wish to be contacted.”
- Ross admitted authoring and disseminating the letter.
- Davis alleged the letter falsely implied Ross fired her for unacceptable work or personal habits and warned recipients against hiring her, harming Davis’s professional reputation and causing emotional distress.
- Davis brought a diversity libel action in federal district court seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
- The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding the letter was not libelous as a matter of law.

## Issues

1. Whether the letter, read as a whole and in context, was reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning under New York law.
2. Whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper where the communication could be construed as stating defamatory facts about a former employee’s competence or conduct.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and remanded.
- The court held the letter was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning.
- The court concluded that, because a plausible defamatory interpretation existed, determining how recipients understood the letter was for the fact-finder rather than resolution on the pleadings.

## Legal Principles

- Under New York defamation law, the court first decides whether challenged words are reasonably capable of a defamatory connotation; if so, whether they were so understood is for the fact-finder.
- A complaint should not be dismissed at the pleading stage unless the statement cannot reasonably be construed as defamatory.
- A communication about a former employee that implies the person was “let go” for unacceptable work or personal habits can be read as asserting facts that injure professional reputation and may constitute defamation per se.
- When language is ambiguous and supports both innocent and defamatory meanings, the case generally proceeds for fact-finding rather than being terminated on a motion to dismiss.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that Ross’s letter could reasonably be read as falsely asserting that Davis was terminated for unacceptable work or personal habits and as warning others not to employ her; because that interpretation is defamatory under New York law, the complaint stated a claim and the case was remanded for further proceedings.


Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1985)