## Facts

- Nelle G. Stewart (testatrix) executed a will on March 3, 1959, and died on May 29, 1965.
- Through the will of her late husband, Dr. Frank A. Stewart, she owned an undivided one-fifth interest in 261.38 acres of farmland.
- In Clause Two, after stating her belief that the farmland “should go back to my late husband’s side of the house,” she devised her one-fifth interest in the farmland as follows: one-half to Stewart Wilson (a nephew) and one-half to Gene Burtle (a nephew), identifying each by name and residence.
- After the will was executed, but before the testatrix died, Gene Burtle died. The testatrix knew of his death but did not revise her will.
- Clause Nine (the residuary clause) directed the executrix to convert the remainder of the estate, “including void or lapsed legacies,” into cash and divide the proceeds equally between Ina Mae Yucus and Hazel Degelow, “or to the survivor or survivors of them” if either predeceased the testatrix.
- A dispute arose over whether Clause Two created a class gift (so that Wilson, as the surviving “class member,” would take the entire one-fifth interest) or separate gifts to two named individuals (so that Burtle’s half would lapse into the residuary).
- Wilson conveyed whatever interest he claimed in Burtle’s half share to Burtle’s children, Joan Elizabeth Dawson and Michael Stewart Burtle (plaintiffs), who pressed the class-gift theory.
- The trial court treated Burtle’s death as creating a latent ambiguity, admitted extrinsic evidence of the testatrix’s intent, and found that the Clause Two devise was not a class gift; it ruled Burtle’s share lapsed and passed to the residuary beneficiaries.
- The plaintiffs appealed from the decree construing the will.

## Issues

1. Whether Clause Two, which names two nephews and gives each a fixed one-half share after a statement that the land should return to the husband’s “side of the house,” created a class gift or separate gifts to individuals.
2. If Clause Two was not a class gift, whether Gene Burtle’s predeceasing the testatrix caused his share to lapse and pass into the residuary estate under the will and Illinois law.

## Decision

- The appellate court affirmed.
- Clause Two was construed as making two separate gifts to named individuals in fixed shares, not a gift to a class.
- Because Burtle died before the testatrix, his one-half share under Clause Two lapsed.
- The lapsed share passed into the residuary estate under Clause Nine (which included “void or lapsed legacies”) for distribution to the residuary beneficiaries, Ina Mae Yucus and Hazel Degelow (or the survivor of them).

## Legal Principles

- A class gift generally requires a gift to beneficiaries described as a group, with membership and shares intended to be determined at the testator’s death; it is less likely where the will identifies beneficiaries by name and fixes fractional shares.
- Language expressing a reason for the gift (such as a wish that property “go back” to one side of a family) is typically read as an explanation of motive and does not, by itself, convert a gift to named individuals into a class gift.
- A will may be read as a whole to determine intent; when the testator uses explicit survivorship language in one clause (such as the residuary clause) but omits it in another, that contrast supports the view that survivorship was not intended in the clause that lacks it.
- Where a named devisee predeceases the testator and the devise is not a class gift, the devise fails by lapse and is distributed according to the will’s residuary clause and applicable lapse rules.
- Extrinsic evidence may be considered when a court finds an ambiguity, but clear operative language identifying individual takers and fixed shares remains the main guide for construction.

## Conclusion

Dawson v. Yucus held that Clause Two of Nelle G. Stewart’s will devised her farmland interest to Stewart Wilson and Gene Burtle as two named individuals in equal halves, not as a class gift to her husband’s family; therefore, when Burtle died before the testatrix, his half share lapsed and passed into the residuary estate for the benefit of the residuary beneficiaries under Clause Nine and Illinois lapse law.


Dawson v. Yucus, 239 N.E.2d 305 (1968)