## Facts

- Olivia de Havilland, a motion picture actress, signed an exclusive personal services contract with Warner Bros. on April 14, 1936, for 52 weeks, with studio options to extend for six additional 52-week periods.
- Her services began May 5, 1936, and continued until August 13, 1943, with interruptions due to studio-imposed suspensions.
- The contract authorized Warner Bros. to suspend her without pay for periods of alleged failure or refusal to perform as instructed, and for time needed to complete roles she refused and were reassigned.
- The contract further permitted Warner Bros. to extend the contract term by periods equal to any suspensions.
- After December 9, 1939, multiple suspensions occurred; total suspension time was approximately 25 weeks (including a short illness-related suspension agreed to by de Havilland).
- De Havilland refused certain roles she believed were unsuitable; her good faith was not disputed, but the contract vested decision-making authority in the producer.
- De Havilland sought declaratory relief that the contract ended under the statutory seven-year limit on enforceability of personal service contracts (former Civil Code § 1980; Labor Code § 2855).
- The trial court declared the contract ended seven years after commencement of service (May 5, 1943); Warner Bros. appealed, arguing the suspensions extended the enforceable term by 25 weeks.

## Issues

1. Whether Labor Code § 2855 allows an exclusive personal services contract to be enforced beyond seven calendar years from commencement of service based on contractual suspension-and-extension provisions.
2. Whether an employee can waive, or be estopped from asserting, the statutory seven-year limitation by continuing to perform and accept contract benefits after suspensions.
3. Whether injunctive relief is appropriate in addition to a declaratory judgment terminating the contract.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal affirmed the declaratory judgment that the contract ended on May 5, 1943, seven calendar years after services commenced.
- The court held the suspension-and-extension provisions were ineffective to extend enforceability beyond the seven-year statutory maximum.
- The court rejected waiver and estoppel theories because the statutory limitation reflects public policy and is not subject to private avoidance.
- The court concluded an injunction was unnecessary absent a showing of threatened conduct beyond what the declaratory judgment resolved.

## Legal Principles

- Labor Code § 2855 limits judicial enforcement of exclusive personal services contracts to seven calendar years from the commencement of service under the contract.
- Contractual devices that toll time or extend a term due to suspensions cannot convert the statutory limit into seven years of “actual service” spread over a longer period.
- The seven-year limitation embodies public policy and is not subject to waiver or estoppel based solely on continued performance or acceptance of benefits.
- Declaratory relief may suffice to settle the parties’ rights; injunctive relief requires a basis beyond the declaration itself, such as a showing of threatened future violation.

## Conclusion

The court held that an exclusive personal services contract cannot be enforced beyond seven calendar years from the start of performance under Labor Code § 2855, and that suspension-based term extensions are ineffective to prolong enforceability past the statutory cap; the declaratory judgment terminating the contract was affirmed, and additional injunctive relief was deemed unnecessary on the record presented.


De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944)