## Facts

- The City of Garland, Texas adopted Ordinance No. 5895 establishing a rental registration and inspection scheme for rental properties.
- Property owners, managers, and tenants filed a § 1983 suit challenging the ordinance’s inspection regime, alleging it authorized warrantless home searches, lacked notice of the right to refuse inspection, and required disclosure of personal information, violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
- The district court denied an initial temporary restraining order request, but later granted a preliminary injunction.
- The preliminary injunction rested on a merits-based Fourth Amendment finding that inspections/searches of unoccupied property authorized by the ordinance were unconstitutional and prohibited enforcement of the offending provisions.
- After the injunction issued, the City amended the ordinance; the underlying constitutional claims became moot and were dismissed.
- The district court awarded attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), finding plaintiffs were a “prevailing party,” and denied the City’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the fee judgment.
- The City appealed only the fee award and the denial of Rule 59(e) relief.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs who obtained a merits-based preliminary injunction, after which the City amended the challenged ordinance and the case was dismissed as moot, were “prevailing part[ies]” entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the City’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the fee judgment.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the attorney’s fee award under § 1988(b).
- The court held plaintiffs were a “prevailing party” because the preliminary injunction produced a judicially sanctioned, material change in the parties’ legal relationship.
- The court affirmed the denial of the City’s Rule 59(e) motion, finding no reversible error.

## Legal Principles

- A “prevailing party” under § 1988(b) is one who obtains a judicially sanctioned material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship (not merely a voluntary change in conduct).
- A preliminary injunction can support prevailing-party status when it is merits-based (reflecting an unambiguous indication of probable success), grants substantial relief that changes the parties’ legal relationship, and is not later undone by an adverse final merits determination.
- Mootness following governmental amendment or repeal does not automatically defeat prevailing-party status where the plaintiff previously obtained enforceable, merits-based injunctive relief.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs who secured a merits-based preliminary injunction against enforcement of unconstitutional inspection provisions were “prevailing parties” entitled to § 1988 attorney’s fees, even though the case later became moot after the City amended the ordinance, and it upheld the district court’s refusal to alter the fee award under Rule 59(e).


Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2008)