## Facts

- Four related personal-injury/wrongful-death actions alleged Chronic Beryllium Disease (CBD) from exposure to beryllium emitted by defendants’ Reading, Pennsylvania plant.
- Plaintiffs included estates of three decedents (Jane Louise Guldin Debiec, Geneva C. Bare, John C. Branco) and Mary I. Russo (and spouse).
- Defendants (plant operators/successors) moved for summary judgment under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury.
- The district court granted summary judgment, holding all claims time-barred and concluding plaintiffs failed, as a matter of law, to exercise reasonable diligence required for tolling under the discovery rule; it denied reconsideration.
- Jane Debiec: diagnosed with sarcoidosis in 1978; treating physician repeatedly stated she did not have CBD and did not change that view before her death in 2000; suit filed May 29, 2001.
- Mary Russo: lived near the plant; by April 1999 suspected a link and collected beryllium-related articles; physicians initially rejected CBD; she sought BeLPT testing; results received June 1999 confirmed CBD; suit filed May 24, 2001.
- Geneva Bare: lived near the plant; in the mid-to-late 1990s raised CBD with a physician who did not think she had CBD and said tests were unreliable; autopsy in November 2000 revealed CBD; suit filed June 6, 2001.
- John Branco: worked at the plant for 33 years; in June 1995 received information alerting him to CBD risk; September 1997 test was negative but his physician said results were unsatisfactory and advised repeat testing; he did not pursue further testing.

## Issues

1. Under Pennsylvania’s discovery rule, when did the statute of limitations begin to run: when each plaintiff knew or should have known, through reasonable diligence, both of injury and its cause?
2. Whether each plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence, and whether that determination could be resolved on summary judgment or was for the jury.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the summary judgments.
- As to Debiec, Russo, and Bare, the court reversed and remanded because reasonable minds could differ on whether each exercised reasonable diligence; the limitations issue should have gone to a jury.
- As to Branco, the court affirmed because he failed to exercise reasonable diligence as a matter of law, making his claim time-barred.

## Legal Principles

- Pennsylvania’s discovery rule tolls limitations where, through no fault of the plaintiff, the injury or its cause is not discoverable within the statutory period.
- Limitations begins when a plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, that (1) an injury exists and (2) it was caused by another.
- Reasonable diligence does not require maximal effort or foresight; it requires the level of attention and judgment expected for self-protection under the circumstances.
- Whether reasonable diligence was exercised is ordinarily a jury question and may be decided as a matter of law only when reasonable minds could not differ.
- Reliance on consistent, plausible medical reassurance may support a finding of reasonable diligence.
- Failure to act on a physician’s explicit warning and recommendation to investigate further can constitute lack of reasonable diligence as a matter of law.

## Conclusion

The court held that, in latent-disease exposure litigation under Pennsylvania law, the discovery-rule inquiry is usually fact-bound and for the jury, reversing summary judgment for plaintiffs who could reasonably have relied on medical reassurances or faced disputed evidence, while affirming dismissal for a plaintiff who ignored clear medical advice to pursue further diagnostic testing.


Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2003)