## Facts

- Christian M. DeJohn was a Temple University graduate student and Pennsylvania Army National Guard member enrolled in a Military and American History program.
- DeJohn alleged repeated conflict with faculty over classroom discussions about the Iraq War, claiming anti-military and anti-war bias.
- Temple maintained a sexual harassment policy defining harassment to include “expressive, visual or physical conduct of a sexual or gender-motivated nature” that has the “purpose or effect” of interfering with educational performance or creating an “intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.”
- DeJohn claimed the policy caused him to self-censor in class discussions, fearing his pro-military views could be treated as punishable harassment.
- DeJohn sued under § 1983 and other theories, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the policy as facially unconstitutional.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment and permanently enjoined enforcement of the challenged policy language; it later entered final judgment awarding nominal damages, but the appeal targeted the earlier order granting injunctive relief.
- During litigation, Temple amended its policy and argued the facial challenge became moot.

## Issues

1. Whether Temple’s amendment of its policy during litigation mooted the facial First Amendment challenge under the voluntary-cessation doctrine.
2. Whether DeJohn had standing to bring a facial First Amendment challenge based on alleged chilling of speech and self-censorship.
3. Whether the policy was facially unconstitutional as overbroad and vague because it restricted protected student speech without objective limiting standards.
4. Whether university speech restrictions of this type should be assessed primarily under higher-education student-speech doctrine rather than workplace-harassment frameworks.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit held the case was not moot because Temple had not shown the challenged policy could not reasonably be expected to recur.
- The court held DeJohn had standing because he plausibly alleged a real and immediate chilling of his speech through self-censorship under a policy directly regulating “expressive” conduct.
- The court affirmed the injunction, holding the challenged policy facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
- The court limited its review to the injunctive relief component and lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s final judgment and nominal damages award in DeJohn’s favor.

## Legal Principles

- Voluntary cessation by a defendant does not moot a case unless the defendant carries a heavy burden to show the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur.
- In First Amendment cases, self-censorship caused by a credible threat of enforcement can constitute an injury sufficient for standing.
- A public university, as a state actor, may not maintain speech regulations that prohibit a substantial amount of protected expression relative to any legitimate sweep (overbreadth doctrine).
- University policies aimed at harassment must be narrowly drawn; regulating speech based on creating an “offensive” environment, without objective thresholds (such as severity and pervasiveness comparable to governing student-harassment standards), risks unconstitutional overbreadth.
- Vague terms that lack objective standards and grant administrators broad discretion can chill protected speech and contribute to facial invalidity.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed an injunction against Temple’s former sexual harassment policy because its broad prohibition on “expressive” gender-motivated conduct creating an “offensive” environment swept in substantial protected speech, was insufficiently bounded by objective standards, and predictably chilled student expression in a public-university setting.


DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008)