## Facts

- David DeLeo sued his former divorce attorney, Edward Nusbaum, and Nusbaum’s law firm for legal malpractice arising from their representation of him in his wife’s marital dissolution action.
- DeLeo alleged that in 1992 his attorneys negligently entered into a stipulation that allowed him only supervised visitation with his children, among other claimed negligent acts or omissions in the divorce matter.
- Connecticut’s general tort limitations statute, General Statutes § 52-577, requires tort actions to be brought within three years “from the date of the act or omission complained of.”
- DeLeo commenced the malpractice action by service of process on June 27, 1996—more than three years after the alleged 1992 malpractice.
- Nusbaum asserted § 52-577 as a special defense and, after DeLeo presented his case, moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the action was time-barred.
- DeLeo argued that the limitations period was tolled because Nusbaum continued to represent him in the same underlying divorce/visitation matter after the alleged malpractice.
- The trial court directed a verdict for Nusbaum, concluding the action was untimely. It also reasoned that even if a continuous-representation rule existed, it would not apply because the attorney-client relationship had effectively ended by June 22, 1993 (citing DeLeo’s letter criticizing the lawyers) and because counsel could not have “cured” or mitigated the harm caused by the stipulation during any continued representation.
- Evidence showed that, after June 22, 1993, Nusbaum still appeared with DeLeo at a deposition (June 28, 1993), filed a motion to withdraw (June 30, 1993), and was permitted to withdraw by court order (July 6, 1993).
- While DeLeo’s appeal was pending, a Connecticut appellate decision adopted a continuous-representation doctrine in another case, and the Connecticut Supreme Court transferred DeLeo’s appeal to itself to decide the issue.

## Issues

1. Whether Connecticut recognizes a continuous-representation doctrine in legal malpractice actions that tolls the three-year limitations period in General Statutes § 52-577.
2. If the doctrine applies, whether the trial court properly took the case from the jury by directing a verdict based on (a) when representation ended and (b) whether DeLeo knew of the alleged malpractice or Nusbaum could still mitigate the harm during continued representation.

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court adopted a continuous-representation rule for legal malpractice claims.
- The Court held that the trial court misapplied the doctrine by treating the attorney’s ability to mitigate harm as a required element, rather than one alternative basis for tolling.
- The Court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to DeLeo, a jury could reasonably find that Nusbaum continued to represent DeLeo in the same matter into the relevant period and that tolling could apply.
- The Court reversed the directed verdict and remanded the case for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Under General Statutes § 52-577, the limitations period in tort runs from the date of the act or omission complained of (an occurrence-based rule), unless a recognized tolling doctrine applies.
- Connecticut recognizes a continuous-representation tolling rule in legal malpractice actions: tolling may apply when (1) the attorney continues to represent the client regarding the same underlying matter and (2) either (a) the client did not know of the alleged malpractice or (b) the attorney could still mitigate the harm allegedly caused during the continued representation period.
- The second prong is disjunctive; a plaintiff is not required to prove that the attorney could still mitigate the harm if the plaintiff can show lack of knowledge of the alleged malpractice during the continued representation.
- Whether representation continued, when it ended, and what the client knew (or should have known) about alleged malpractice are commonly fact questions that should not be resolved against the plaintiff on a directed-verdict record when reasonable jurors could draw different inferences.
- A directed verdict is proper only when, taking the evidence and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, the jury could not reasonably find for that party; legal questions tied to the meaning of a tolling rule receive plenary review, while application to disputed facts may require a jury determination.

## Conclusion

The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized a continuous-representation tolling doctrine for legal malpractice claims and reversed a directed verdict that had treated DeLeo’s action as time-barred under § 52-577, holding that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and improperly resolved jury questions about continued representation and DeLeo’s knowledge of the alleged malpractice.


DeLeo v. Nusbaum, 263 Conn. 588, 821 A.2d 744 (2003)