## Facts

- An African American daughter purchased a $295 salon package for her mother at an upscale salon/spa in Virginia, covering multiple services and lunch.
- The mother used part of the package (facial, massage, lunch) without incident.
- While the mother was at the salon, the daughter called to add a paid hair-coloring service; a salon employee agreed by phone to perform it.
- The daughter later came to the salon to pay for the added service and check on her mother.
- The receptionist told the daughter there was “a problem” because the salon did not “do black people’s hair.”
- The mother and daughter sued, alleging race discrimination and emotional distress.

## Issues

1. Whether a beauty salon/day spa is a “place of public accommodation” covered by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2. Whether the evidence created a genuine dispute that the salon discriminated on the basis of race in making or enforcing a contract in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
3. Whether the plaintiffs produced evidence sufficient to satisfy Virginia’s requirements for intentional infliction of emotional distress (including severe emotional distress).

## Decision

- Affirmed summary judgment for the salon on the Title II claim because the salon was not a covered “place of public accommodation” under the statute’s enumerated categories.
- Reversed summary judgment on the § 1981 claim because the plaintiffs produced evidence permitting a reasonable jury to find race-based denial of a contracted-for service.
- Affirmed summary judgment on the Virginia IIED claim for failure to meet the state’s demanding elements, including severity of distress.
- Remanded for further proceedings limited to the § 1981 claim.

## Legal Principles

- Title II applies only to the specific categories of establishments listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b); courts will not extend coverage beyond the statutory text.
- A business not covered by Title II may still be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 if it refuses to contract or to perform contractual services because of race.
- Direct race-based statements connected to a denial of service can constitute evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment on a § 1981 contracting claim.
- Under Virginia law, IIED requires proof of outrageous conduct and “severe” emotional distress; conclusory or insufficiently severe distress evidence warrants summary judgment.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that Title II’s limited definition of public accommodations did not reach a salon/spa, but that the alleged race-based refusal to provide an agreed, paid hair-coloring service created a triable § 1981 claim; it also upheld dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Virginia IIED claim for lack of proof of severe emotional distress.


Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2006)