## Facts

- Ida Lomovt, a minor, was struck by a streetcar (sometimes described in secondary sources as a “train”) owned and operated by Denver City Tramway Company.
- Lomovt suffered personal injuries and sued the company, alleging the company’s negligence caused the accident.
- The company defended by asserting Lomovt was improperly on or too near the tracks and that her conduct caused or contributed to the accident.
- At trial, the company called Earl Murray, an eyewitness, whose testimony largely supported the company’s account of how the accident occurred.
- On cross-examination, Lomovt’s counsel asked Murray whether, immediately after the accident, he stated that “the motorman ought to be lynched.”
- Murray denied making that statement.
- Lomovt then called two other witnesses who were present shortly after the accident; over the company’s objection, both testified they heard Murray make the “lynched” statement.
- The trial court admitted the testimony only for impeachment of Murray’s credibility and instructed the jury that the statement was not evidence of the company’s “guilt” (i.e., not substantive proof of negligence).
- The jury returned a verdict for Lomovt, and judgment entered accordingly.
- The company appealed, challenging the impeachment ruling and arguing the statement’s prejudicial character required reversal.

## Issues

1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by permitting the plaintiff to introduce extrinsic evidence that a defense eyewitness previously said “the motorman ought to be lynched,” after the witness denied it, when the evidence was admitted only to impeach and the jury was instructed not to treat it as proof of negligence?

## Decision

- The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Lomovt.
- The court held the trial court did not reversibly err by admitting the testimony about Murray’s alleged prior statement for the limited purpose of impeachment, given the limiting instruction.
- The court treated the impeachment as directed to a matter tied to the dispute over fault in the accident and therefore within the allowable scope for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, rather than an impermissible attempt to contradict a witness on a merely collateral point.

## Legal Principles

- Prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach a witness’s credibility after the witness is confronted with the statement and denies or fails to admit it.
- Under the common-law approach applied in this era, a prior inconsistent statement admitted for impeachment is not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted; the jury must be told it cannot use the statement as substantive proof of liability.
- Trial courts have substantial discretion to control cross-examination on matters affecting credibility, but the ability to introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness is more limited.
- Impeachment through contradiction by extrinsic evidence must relate to a matter material to the issues being tried; courts restrict proof offered only to dispute collateral points to avoid side litigation and unfair prejudice.
- A clear limiting instruction can reduce the risk that the jury will treat inflammatory impeachment material as proof of negligence rather than as a credibility attack.

## Conclusion

Denver City Tramway Co. v. Lomovt affirms a plaintiff’s verdict in a streetcar-injury case and is chiefly cited for evidence law: after a defense eyewitness denied making an immediate post-accident remark that “the motorman ought to be lynched,” the plaintiff could call other witnesses to prove the statement as a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment only, so long as the jury was instructed not to treat it as substantive evidence of the company’s negligence.


Denver City Tramway Co. v. Lomovt, 126 P. 276 (1912)