## Facts

- Frantz DePierre was charged in federal court with distributing 50 grams or more of “cocaine base” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).
- The statutory scheme set mandatory minimum sentences for drug quantities, including higher penalties for specified amounts of “cocaine base” than for cocaine powder.
- At trial, DePierre requested a jury instruction requiring the government to prove the substance was specifically “crack cocaine” to trigger the “cocaine base” mandatory minimum.
- The district court refused to limit “cocaine base” to crack in the instructions.
- The jury convicted DePierre, and the district court imposed the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence.
- The First Circuit affirmed, following its precedent that “cocaine base” covers all base forms of cocaine.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the meaning of “cocaine base” in § 841(b)(1).

## Issues

1. Whether “cocaine base” in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) refers to cocaine in its chemically basic form generally or only to “crack cocaine.”
2. Whether any ambiguity in the term “cocaine base” requires application of the rule of lenity to favor a narrower, crack-only construction.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit.
- The Court held that “cocaine base” in § 841(b)(1) means cocaine in its chemically basic form, not just crack cocaine.
- The Court rejected DePierre’s requested crack-only jury instruction as inconsistent with the statute.
- The Court held the rule of lenity did not apply because the statute was not grievously ambiguous after considering text, structure, and context.
- Justice Scalia concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing with the chemical-definition holding and declining to join the portion relying on legislative history.

## Legal Principles

- In § 841(b)(1), “cocaine base” refers to cocaine in its chemically basic form, encompassing substances such as crack cocaine, freebase, and coca paste.
- Statutory interpretation begins with the text; enforcement practice and colloquial usage cannot narrow otherwise clear statutory language.
- Redundancy or awkwardness in a statutory structure is not enough to justify rewriting a term to adopt a narrower meaning not expressed by the text.
- The rule of lenity applies only where, after using ordinary interpretive tools, a criminal statute remains grievously ambiguous.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 841(b)(1)’s heightened mandatory minimums for “cocaine base” apply to any chemically basic form of cocaine, not solely to crack cocaine, and it affirmed DePierre’s conviction and sentence under that broader definition.


DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70 (2011)