## Facts

- John Semmes Devecmon sued the executors of John S. Combs’s estate seeking reimbursement for money Devecmon spent on a European trip in 1878.
- Devecmon alleged the trip was taken at Combs’s instance and request and on Combs’s express promise to reimburse Devecmon for all money expended.
- The trip was unrelated to Combs’s business; Combs’s willingness to pay was described as “liberal and generous.”
- Devecmon pleaded in assumpsit on the common counts and filed a bill of particulars listing, among other items, cash Devecmon contributed for his Europe expenses based on Combs’s promise to “make up” the expenses.
- Liability was established by default judgment; a jury was impaneled only to assess damages.
- At the damages hearing, the trial court excluded all proffered testimony about the trip, Devecmon’s expenditures, and Combs’s promise of repayment, and Devecmon excepted.
- Devecmon appealed, challenging the evidentiary exclusion.

## Issues

1. Whether expenditures incurred at the promisor’s request and in reliance on an express promise of reimbursement constitute sufficient consideration, rather than an unenforceable gratuitous promise.
2. Whether, after the promisee has fully performed and only payment remains, recovery may be had on the common counts (indebitatus assumpsit) without pleading a special contract, making the excluded testimony admissible.

## Decision

- The appellate court held that the proffered evidence, if believed, showed a “burden incurred at the request” of Combs and therefore sufficient consideration for a promise to reimburse.
- The court held that because Devecmon had fully performed and only payment remained, he could proceed in indebitatus assumpsit on the common counts and was not required to declare on a special contract.
- The trial court erred by excluding the testimony supporting the claim for money paid at Combs’s request.
- Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- A promise to reimburse is supported by consideration when the promisee incurs expenses at the promisor’s request and in reliance on an express promise of repayment, even if the expenditure also benefits the promisee.
- Such a promise is distinct from a mere promise to make a gift or perform a gratuitous service.
- When the promisee has fully performed and the only remaining obligation is payment of money, the claim may be brought under the common counts (including money paid at the defendant’s request) rather than on a special contract.
- Evidence is admissible when it tends to prove an item within the bill of particulars that matches a recognized common count theory of recovery.

## Conclusion

The court recognized induced expenditures at a promisor’s request, made on an express promise of reimbursement, as sufficient consideration and held that after full performance the claimant may recover in indebitatus assumpsit; excluding testimony offered to prove those elements was reversible error.


Devecmon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888)