Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004)

Facts

  • Jerome Alford stopped on a Washington highway to assist a stranded motorist while driving a vehicle equipped with “wig-wag” headlights resembling a police vehicle.
  • Washington State Patrol Officer Joi Haner, suspecting possible police impersonation, pursued and stopped Alford after he drove off as she approached.
  • During the stop, Haner observed handcuffs and a police scanner in Alford’s car.
  • Sergeant Gerald Devenpeck arrived, discovered Alford was recording the encounter, and arrested him for violating the Washington Privacy Act.
  • The state trial court dismissed the Privacy Act charge because recording police during a traffic stop was not a crime under Washington law.
  • Alford filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an unconstitutional arrest; the district court denied qualified immunity, and a jury returned a verdict for the officers.
  • The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the arrest lacked probable cause and rejecting alternative offenses because they were not “closely related” to the offense cited at arrest.

Issues

  1. Whether the Fourth Amendment requires that the offense establishing probable cause for a warrantless arrest be “closely related” to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense the officer identifies at the time of arrest.
  2. Whether an arrest is constitutional when probable cause exists for some offense, even though the officer cited a different offense that does not support probable cause.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded.
  • The Court held that a warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause to believe any crime has been or is being committed.
  • The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “closely related offense” rule.
  • The Court declined to decide whether probable cause existed for impersonation or obstruction, leaving that determination to the lower courts on remand.
  • Probable cause is an objective inquiry; an arresting officer’s subjective intent and stated legal theory are irrelevant, except for the facts the officer knew.
  • The Fourth Amendment does not require that the offense supplying probable cause match the offense announced by the officer at the time of arrest.
  • An arrest may be constitutional even if the offense cited at arrest is not a crime, so long as the known facts establish probable cause for a different offense.

Conclusion

The Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause standard is objective and does not depend on the officer’s on-scene explanation for the arrest; if the facts known to the officer establish probable cause for any offense, the arrest is reasonable, and courts may not impose a “closely related offense” requirement.