## Facts

- Roque Mendez worked as a chief operator at Diamond Shamrock’s refinery in Three Rivers, Texas.
- Near the end of a workday, Mendez picked up loose nails (worth under $5) and placed them in his lunch bag while cleaning the work area.
- The refinery had experienced recent small thefts, and the employee handbook authorized termination for stealing company property.
- After Mendez left, a security officer discovered the nails in Mendez’s lunch bag in the plant and reported the incident to management and human resources.
- The next day, supervisors confronted Mendez, accused him of stealing, and questioned him; Mendez did not deny taking the nails and agreed with the characterization that he was “stealing,” later testifying he felt intimidated during the meeting.
- Diamond Shamrock terminated Mendez for theft under its policy.
- The reason for termination (stealing) became widely known in the small community, including among prospective employers.
- Mendez sued for (1) false-light invasion of privacy and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

## Issues

1. Whether a false-light invasion of privacy claim based on allegedly false, reputation-damaging publicity must satisfy constitutional free-speech safeguards, including an actual malice standard, rather than negligence.
2. Whether Texas should permit false-light claims that substantially duplicate defamation and risk allowing plaintiffs to bypass defamation limitations and defenses.
3. Whether the investigation, confrontation, termination for theft, and resulting community knowledge could constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct sufficient for IIED.

## Decision

- The Texas Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals and remanded.
- The court rejected the negligence standard used to uphold the false-light verdict and required defamation-type constitutional safeguards, including actual malice, for false-light claims of this kind.
- The court agreed the evidence was legally insufficient to support IIED because the employer’s conduct did not meet the “extreme and outrageous” threshold.

## Legal Principles

- When a privacy claim is premised on allegedly false statements that cause reputational harm, it substantially overlaps with defamation and must not be used to avoid defamation’s constitutional and common-law limitations.
- For false-light liability involving such speech, the plaintiff must prove “actual malice” (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth) when constitutional protections apply; negligence is insufficient.
- Actual malice requires evidence the defendant knew the statement was false or consciously disregarded a high probability of falsity.
- In the employment context, routine investigative and disciplinary actions, including termination under a stated policy, ordinarily do not constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct necessary for IIED.

## Conclusion

The court treated the false-light theory as duplicative of defamation when grounded in allegedly false, reputation-injuring accusations and required an actual malice showing rather than negligence, while also holding that the employer’s termination-related conduct fell short of the high bar for IIED.


Diamond Shamrock Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992)