## Facts

- Albert DiCenso owned and managed a four-unit apartment building and personally collected rent.
- Christina L. Brown (age 18) lived in an apartment there with her partner, Thomas Andrews, and their infant child beginning in June 1990.
- In mid-October or early November 1990, DiCenso came to collect rent and, while speaking with Brown at the door, caressed her arm and back and suggested she could pay rent in “other ways.”
- Brown slammed the door; DiCenso remained outside briefly, calling her vulgar names, and then left.
- On January 15, 1991, DiCenso again visited to collect rent, leading to a confrontation with Andrews and a police call.
- On January 29, 1991, DiCenso served a notice to vacate.
- On January 31, 1991, Brown filed an administrative complaint with HUD alleging sex discrimination/sexual harassment under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
- After HUD issued a charge, an ALJ initially dismissed the complaint, concluding the single incident did not create a hostile housing environment.
- HUD’s Secretary’s Designee reversed on liability, found a hostile environment, and remanded; the ALJ then awarded compensatory damages, a civil penalty, and injunctive relief.
- DiCenso petitioned for judicial review of HUD’s final order.

## Issues

1. Whether hostile-environment sexual harassment is actionable as sex discrimination under the FHA.
2. Whether a single incident involving unwanted touching and a sexualized rent proposition, followed by insults, is sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile housing environment under the FHA.
3. What level of judicial deference is owed to HUD’s legal conclusion that the proven conduct created a hostile environment.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed HUD’s final order.
- The court held that hostile-environment sexual harassment claims are cognizable under the FHA, using a Title VII–type framework.
- Applying a severe-or-pervasive standard and an objective “reasonable person” test, the court held the single incident proven here was not sufficiently egregious to amount to a hostile housing environment.
- The court treated the hostile-environment determination as a legal question reviewed de novo and declined to give controlling deference to HUD’s contrary legal conclusion.
- Because liability failed as a matter of law, the compensatory damages, civil penalty, and injunctive relief were set aside.

## Legal Principles

- Sexual harassment can constitute discrimination “because of sex” under the FHA, including under a hostile-environment theory.
- Hostile-environment liability requires harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter housing conditions and create an abusive environment that unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of the premises.
- Isolated incidents generally do not meet the standard unless extremely serious.
- Agency factfinding is reviewed for substantial evidence, but whether established facts satisfy the hostile-environment standard is a legal determination reviewed de novo.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit recognized that the FHA permits hostile-environment sexual harassment claims but held that one episode of inappropriate touching and a sexualized suggestion, followed by name-calling, was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile housing environment, and it reversed HUD’s order imposing damages, penalties, and injunctive relief.


DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996)