## Facts

- Clarence Dickerson was charged under Richmond City Code § 20-83(a), which made it unlawful to “loiter, lurk, remain, or wander about” in a public place “in a manner or under circumstances manifesting the purpose of engaging in prostitution” or other “lewd, lascivious or indecent” acts.
- At about 1:10 a.m., detectives saw Dickerson standing on a street corner in an area associated with prostitution activity.
- Dickerson was dressed in blue jeans and a shirt tied above his navel, and he was holding a purse.
- The detectives observed Dickerson wave at passing cars occupied by men.
- Dickerson spoke with the drivers of three different cars, for about one to three minutes each.
- When an unmarked police car drove by, Dickerson moved to hide from view.
- Other than waving at cars, the detectives did not see Dickerson make suggestive gestures or expressions.
- Shortly after 1:30 a.m., the detectives approached Dickerson and asked what he had been doing on the corner; Dickerson said he had been doing nothing and was “just resting.”
- Dickerson was arrested, tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, convicted of loitering for the purpose of prostitution, and sentenced to twelve months in jail.
- On appeal, Dickerson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence (and also raised other claims that the appellate court did not reach).

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dickerson loitered “in a manner or under circumstances manifesting the purpose” of engaging in prostitution (or other proscribed conduct) as required by Richmond City Code § 20-83(a).
2. Whether the appellate court needed to decide Dickerson’s constitutional challenge to the ordinance after resolving the sufficiency issue.
3. Whether the appellate court needed to decide Dickerson’s mistrial argument based on the prosecutor’s opening statement after resolving the sufficiency issue.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed Dickerson’s conviction.
- The court held that the City’s proof did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Dickerson had the specific purpose required by § 20-83(a).
- Because the conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence, the court did not decide the constitutional challenge to the ordinance or the mistrial claim.

## Legal Principles

- A loitering-for-prostitution ordinance like Richmond City Code § 20-83(a) requires proof of both (1) the prohibited conduct (loitering, lurking, remaining, or wandering in a public place) and (2) a specific purpose to engage in prostitution (or other listed sexual misconduct).
- The “purpose” element is a specific-intent requirement; suspicious conduct alone is not enough unless it shows the prohibited purpose beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Specific intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence, but the circumstantial proof must do more than raise suspicion; it must be consistent with guilt and must exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence.
- In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and gives the prosecution the benefit of reasonable inferences, but the conviction still must rest on proof of every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- When a conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence, the appellate disposition functions as an acquittal on that charge, making further prosecution for the same offense impermissible.

## Conclusion

The court reversed Dickerson’s conviction because, even viewing the evidence favorably to the City, Dickerson’s late-night presence in a prostitution area, his clothing, waving at cars, brief conversations with drivers, and attempt to avoid an unmarked police car showed at most a suspicion of intent and did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was loitering with the specific purpose of engaging in prostitution as required by Richmond City Code § 20-83(a).


Dickerson v. City of Richmond, 346 S.E.2d 333 (1986)