## Facts

- Janice Dickinson publicly stated in 2014 that William H. Cosby, Jr. drugged and raped her in 1982.
- Cosby retained attorney Martin D. Singer, who sent a demand letter to media outlets stating Dickinson’s accusation was “fabricated” and an “outrageous defamatory lie,” and threatened litigation if aired or published.
- Singer issued a press release the next day, as “ATTORNEY FOR BILL COSBY,” stating Dickinson’s rape accusation was a “lie” and a “fabricated lie,” purportedly contradicted by documentary proof and her prior statements.
- Dickinson sued Cosby for defamation and related claims based on the demand letter and press release, then filed a first amended complaint adding Singer as a defendant.
- Cosby filed a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) aimed at the original complaint.
- The trial court struck the entire first amended complaint as improperly filed during the pendency of Cosby’s anti-SLAPP motion; it granted Cosby’s anti-SLAPP motion as to claims based on the demand letter and denied it as to claims based on the press release.
- Dickinson appealed the order striking the amended complaint and the grant of the anti-SLAPP motion as to the demand letter; Cosby appealed the denial as to the press release.

## Issues

1. Whether a plaintiff may file an amended complaint adding a new defendant while another defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion is pending, and whether striking the amended complaint in its entirety was error.
2. Whether Dickinson showed a probability of prevailing on defamation-based claims arising from the demand letter, defeating anti-SLAPP at the second step.
3. Whether Dickinson showed a probability of prevailing on defamation-based claims arising from the press release, defeating anti-SLAPP at the second step.

## Decision

- Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
- Reversed the order striking the first amended complaint as to Singer because Singer had not filed an anti-SLAPP motion and the statute did not bar adding him by amendment.
- Reversed the grant of Cosby’s anti-SLAPP motion as to claims based on the demand letter because Dickinson made a prima facie showing sufficient to proceed.
- Affirmed the denial of Cosby’s anti-SLAPP motion as to claims based on the press release because Dickinson likewise made a sufficient prima facie showing.

## Legal Principles

- Anti-SLAPP analysis proceeds in two steps: (1) defendant shows the claim arises from protected activity; (2) plaintiff must show a probability of prevailing by presenting evidence that, if credited, would support judgment.
- A categorical accusation that a named accuser’s specific allegation is a “lie” or “fabricated” may be construed as an actionable assertion of fact (provable true or false), not protected opinion, particularly when framed as supported by “documentary proof.”
- On anti-SLAPP step two, courts accept the plaintiff’s evidence as true and do not resolve credibility disputes or weigh competing evidence.
- The ability to amend during the pendency of an anti-SLAPP motion is defendant-specific; a pending anti-SLAPP motion by one defendant does not automatically bar amendment to add a different defendant who has not invoked § 425.16.
- Whether an attorney’s public statements made expressly on behalf of a client may be attributed to the client can present factual issues not suitable for resolution on an anti-SLAPP motion.
- Assertions of litigation privilege for prelitigation communications may depend on context and connection to contemplated litigation and may not be conclusively resolved against the plaintiff on a limited anti-SLAPP record.

## Conclusion

The court permitted the defamation action to proceed based on both the demand letter and press release, holding Dickinson presented sufficient prima facie evidence to survive anti-SLAPP step two, and it reinstated the amended complaint against Cosby’s attorney because the pending anti-SLAPP motion did not justify striking an amendment adding a new, nonmoving defendant.


Dickinson v. Cosby, 17 Cal. App. 5th 655, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (Ct. App. 2017)