## Facts

- David Luther Legg negligently drove an автомобile on Bluegrass Road near Clover Lane in Sacramento County and struck two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon, killing her.
- Erin was lawfully crossing the road at the time of the collision.
- Erin’s mother, Margery M. Dillon, and sibling, Cheryl Dillon, were nearby and alleged they witnessed the collision.
- Margery alleged serious emotional shock with resulting physical injury from witnessing Erin’s death.
- Margery was not in the car’s path and alleged no personal risk of physical impact; Cheryl’s position arguably placed her in potential danger.
- The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings against Margery’s emotional-distress claim under a “zone of danger” limitation, while allowing Cheryl’s claim to proceed.
- Margery appealed, seeking recognition of a negligence duty to a bystander who witnesses serious injury to a close relative.

## Issues

1. Whether a negligent driver owes a duty of due care to a bystander who suffers serious emotional distress with physical injury from contemporaneously witnessing the negligent death or injury of a close relative, even though the bystander was outside any zone of physical danger.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the pleadings against Margery Dillon.
- The court held that a bystander may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when the plaintiff is a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s negligence, even if not within the zone of physical danger.
- The court disapproved the categorical zone-of-danger bar previously applied to similar bystander claims.
- The court directed that duty be assessed through a foreseeability analysis guided by factors aimed at limiting liability to a predictable class of plaintiffs.

## Legal Principles

- Duty in negligence turns on whether the defendant’s conduct created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff; categorical exclusions that defeat otherwise foreseeable claims are disfavored.
- A bystander’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is not barred solely because the bystander was not personally endangered by physical impact.
- Foreseeability for bystander emotional-distress claims is evaluated using nonexclusive guidelines:
  - Whether the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident (proximity).
  - Whether the shock resulted from direct, sensory, and contemporaneous observation of the accident rather than later learning of it (contemporaneous perception).
  - Whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related (relationship).
- Concerns about fabricated, trivial, or excessive claims do not justify denying recovery as a matter of law where conventional litigation safeguards can test genuineness and causation.
- Line-drawing difficulties in future cases do not justify denying recovery on facts strongly supporting foreseeability; the foreseeability guidelines help define the class of potential plaintiffs.

## Conclusion

The court recognized that a negligent actor may owe a duty to a nearby, closely related bystander who contemporaneously perceives a negligently caused death or injury and suffers serious emotional distress with physical injury, replacing a rigid zone-of-danger limitation with a foreseeability-based approach guided by proximity, contemporaneous perception, and relationship.


Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968)