## Facts

- Rose Dionne became a Rhode Island judgment debtor after losing an eviction action that included a money judgment for one month’s rent.
- After an execution on the judgment was returned unsatisfied, the creditor filed a second “debt on judgment” action and sought a post-judgment writ of attachment against Dionne’s property.
- Under Rhode Island law and district court rules, the clerk issued the writ routinely at the creditor’s request, without prior notice to Dionne and without a court hearing.
- The writ was served on Dionne’s bank, which froze her account, preventing access to funds that could include state- or federally-exempt monies.
- Dionne did not receive clear written notice that her property had been attached, that exemptions might apply, or how to claim exemptions.
- Rhode Island procedures did not provide a clear, prompt, post-attachment hearing mechanism directed to determining exemption claims.
- Dionne filed a § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the chief clerk responsible for issuing writs under the challenged procedures and sought to proceed as a Rule 23(b)(2) class.

## Issues

1. Whether Rhode Island’s post-judgment attachment procedures violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by failing to provide adequate notice of exemption rights and a prompt, meaningful opportunity to assert exemptions after property was attached.
2. Whether a district court may deny Rule 23(b)(2) class certification on the ground that class treatment is “unnecessary” because injunctive or declaratory relief would effectively benefit all similarly situated persons.

## Decision

- The First Circuit modified and affirmed the district court’s judgment.
- The court affirmed that Rhode Island’s then-existing post-judgment attachment scheme was constitutionally deficient because it did not provide adequate notice about exemptions or a prompt procedure to adjudicate exemption claims after attachment.
- The court upheld injunctive relief against the chief clerk but modified the injunction’s scope to address the constitutional deficiencies without unduly restricting post-judgment collection generally.
- On class certification, the court held the district court’s “necessity” rationale was legally incorrect because Rule 23(b)(2) does not impose a separate requirement that class treatment be necessary to obtain effective relief.

## Legal Principles

- Due process applies to state-authorized post-judgment attachment mechanisms when a creditor can freeze a debtor’s property through clerk-issued process.
- Due process requires timely, clear notice that attached property may be exempt under state or federal law and notice of how to assert exemption claims.
- Due process requires a prompt and meaningful post-attachment opportunity to be heard on exemption issues, with procedures suited to quick resolution when funds are frozen.
- A court may not deny Rule 23(b)(2) certification solely because the requested injunction or declaration would, as a practical matter, benefit nonparties; “necessity” is not an independent requirement of Rule 23(b)(2).

## Conclusion

The First Circuit held that Rhode Island’s routine, clerk-issued post-judgment attachment process violated due process because it lacked adequate exemption notice and a prompt exemption hearing, and it clarified that Rule 23(b)(2) certification cannot be denied merely because the same injunctive relief would likely protect all similarly situated debtors.


Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985)