## Facts

- William G. Osborne was convicted in Alaska state court of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault based on eyewitness testimony and biological evidence, including DNA testing performed at the time (DQ Alpha testing on a condom).
- After conviction, Osborne sought access to the State’s biological evidence to conduct more discriminating DNA testing (e.g., RFLP and later STR) at his own expense, asserting it could prove innocence.
- Alaska courts denied relief, concluding there was no federal constitutional right to postconviction DNA testing and that Alaska’s existing postconviction and discovery mechanisms did not require the requested testing on these facts.
- Osborne filed a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials, alleging the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause required postconviction access to the evidence for additional DNA testing.
- The federal district court initially dismissed the action as barred by the habeas/§ 1983 line associated with Heck v. Humphrey, but the Ninth Circuit held § 1983 was available.
- On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Osborne, recognizing a limited due process right to obtain the evidence for testing; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying partly on Brady-like disclosure reasoning.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides a state prisoner a federal constitutional right to obtain postconviction access to the State’s biological evidence for DNA testing.
2. Whether federal courts may require such access by extending Brady-style disclosure principles beyond trial into the postconviction setting.
3. Whether, assuming a prisoner can proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Alaska’s postconviction procedures were constitutionally inadequate as applied to DNA-testing requests.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 5–4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts.
- Assuming without deciding that § 1983 was an available vehicle, the Court held there is no freestanding due process right to obtain postconviction access to the State’s evidence for DNA testing.
- The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s extension of Brady to create a postconviction right to evidence for testing.
- The Court held federal courts may disturb state postconviction regimes only if they are fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights the State provides, and Alaska’s framework was not shown to meet that standard.

## Legal Principles

- The Due Process Clause does not confer a freestanding constitutional right to postconviction access to the State’s evidence for DNA testing.
- Claims seeking new postconviction DNA testing do not warrant recognition as a new substantive due process right absent a deeply rooted historical tradition and careful restraint in expanding fundamental rights.
- Procedural due process review of state postconviction mechanisms is highly deferential; federal courts may intervene only if state procedures are fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights the State has created.
- Brady’s pretrial disclosure duty is aimed at ensuring trial fairness and does not create a continuing, postconviction discovery right to access evidence for retesting.
- Policy choices about the scope, conditions, and administration of postconviction DNA access are primarily for legislatures and state-law processes, not federal constitutional mandates.

## Conclusion

The Court held that, even assuming a § 1983 action is available, due process does not create a constitutional entitlement to postconviction DNA testing, and federal courts may not impose Brady-like disclosure duties after conviction; state postconviction procedures remain controlling unless shown to be fundamentally inadequate.


District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009)