## Facts

- Billie F. Dixon sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for premises liability after tripping on a rope-like plastic strip on the floor near checkout registers at a Wal-Mart store in Longview, Texas.
- The incident occurred around 5:00 p.m. on a Sunday in July 1996 as Dixon was leaving the store after checking out.
- Wal-Mart did not dispute that the plastic strip created an unreasonable risk of harm or that Dixon was injured as a result of the fall.
- Dixon did not claim Wal-Mart had actual notice of the plastic strip; she proceeded only on a constructive-knowledge theory.
- Dixon argued constructive notice based on (1) the strip’s proximity to checkout employees and (2) an inference that the strip likely came from early-morning newspaper/magazine stocking and therefore had been on the floor for hours.
- Wal-Mart presented evidence that employees were trained to monitor floors for debris and that the area had been inspected approximately five minutes before the fall.
- After a jury verdict for Dixon, Wal-Mart moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL); the district court denied the renewed motion, and Wal-Mart appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether Dixon presented legally sufficient evidence that Wal-Mart had constructive knowledge of the plastic strip under Texas premises-liability law.
2. Whether proximity of the hazard to Wal-Mart employees, without temporal evidence, can establish constructive notice.
3. Whether Dixon’s proof regarding how long the plastic strip was on the floor was non-speculative and sufficient to support the verdict.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Wal-Mart’s renewed JMOL motion.
- The court held that Dixon’s evidence was legally insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Wal-Mart had constructive knowledge of the hazard.
- The case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment as a matter of law for Wal-Mart (a take-nothing judgment against Dixon).

## Legal Principles

- Under Texas premises-liability law, a plaintiff must prove the premises owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the specific dangerous condition.
- When actual notice is not shown, constructive notice requires some evidence of how long the condition existed before the injury; temporal evidence is required to assess the owner’s opportunity to discover the hazard.
- Constructive notice cannot be inferred solely from the hazard’s close physical proximity to the owner’s employees.
- Speculation about the hazard’s origin or duration, without evidence tying the condition to a specific timeframe, is insufficient to establish constructive knowledge.
- On JMOL review, a verdict cannot stand if the record lacks a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant on an essential element.

## Conclusion

Because Dixon relied on proximity evidence barred as sufficient proof under controlling Texas law and offered only speculative, unsupported temporal proof—further weakened by evidence of a recent inspection—the Fifth Circuit held that no reasonable jury could find constructive notice and directed entry of judgment for Wal-Mart.


Dixon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 330 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2003)