## Facts

- Tammie Dobson went to a J.C. Penney store in High Point, North Carolina, with her 15‑month‑old daughter to pick up a layaway item.
- Holly Harris, a Penney employee, mistakenly retrieved the wrong customer’s layaway, which led Dobson to write a check for the mistaken item before the error was discovered.
- After Harris located Dobson’s correct item, Dobson wrote a second check to account for the price difference, and she became angry and berated Harris.
- While Harris worked to correct the transaction, Dobson’s daughter became restless.
- Dobson yelled at her daughter, picked the child up from the counter, and set her back down hard; accounts differed about how forceful the act was and whether the child’s head was near a sharp edge.
- Harris, concerned about possible child abuse or neglect, reported her account of the incident to the Guilford County Department of Social Services (DSS) and, at DSS’s request, provided identifying information taken from Dobson’s check.
- DSS investigated but could not substantiate the complaint and closed the matter.
- Dobson sued Harris for slander per se based on the report to DSS and sued J.C. Penney under respondeat superior; she also asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- The trial court granted summary judgment to Harris and J.C. Penney, and Dobson appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether Harris’s report to DSS alleging suspected child abuse or neglect was protected by a qualified privilege such that Dobson’s slander per se claim could not proceed absent evidence of actual malice.
2. Whether Dobson forecast sufficient evidence to defeat the privilege and create a triable issue on defamation (including any required “publication” element).
3. Whether Harris’s conduct in making the DSS report (and Penney’s involvement) could constitute extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress sufficient to support IIED.
4. Whether J.C. Penney could be held vicariously liable under respondeat superior for Harris’s report.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Harris and J.C. Penney.
- Harris’s communication to DSS about suspected child abuse was subject to a qualified privilege because it was made on a matter of shared duty/interest: reporting suspected abuse and DSS’s duty to investigate.
- Dobson failed to forecast evidence that Harris acted with actual malice (such as spite, knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard for truth) sufficient to overcome the privilege; therefore, the slander per se claim failed as a matter of law.
- The court concluded that reporting suspected child mistreatment to DSS under these circumstances was not extreme and outrageous conduct, and Dobson did not show evidence supporting the required level of severe emotional distress; the IIED claim failed.
- Because Harris committed no actionable tort on this record, J.C. Penney could not be held liable under respondeat superior.

## Legal Principles

- A communication made in good faith on a subject in which the speaker has an interest or duty, made to a person or entity with a corresponding interest or duty, is protected by a qualified privilege.
- Qualified privilege defeats defamation liability unless the plaintiff shows actual malice, which may include ill will or spite, or knowledge that the statement was false, or reckless disregard as to its truth.
- Accusations imputing serious misconduct may constitute slander per se if unprivileged, but a conditionally privileged report to the proper governmental agency is not actionable absent proof defeating the privilege.
- IIED requires (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause emotional distress (or reckless indifference to the likelihood of causing it), and (3) severe emotional distress; a good‑faith report to authorities about suspected wrongdoing generally does not satisfy the “extreme and outrageous” requirement.
- Respondeat superior liability depends on an underlying actionable tort by the employee; if the employee is not liable, the employer is not vicariously liable on that theory.

## Conclusion

The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that an employee’s report to DSS of suspected child abuse observed in a store was conditionally privileged and could not support a slander per se claim without evidence of actual malice; it also held that making the report was not extreme and outrageous conduct supporting IIED, and it affirmed summary judgment for both the employee and the employer.


Dobson v. Harris, 521 S.E.2d 710 (1999)