## Facts

- Roger L. Sadler left town for five days and arranged for his neighbors’ children to care for his dog during his absence.
- The primary caretaker was Philip M. Docherty, age 10; his 12-year-old sister also participated.
- Philip was taken to Sadler’s home, shown where the supplies for the dog were kept, and told what to do while Sadler was away.
- Philip’s assignment included feeding the dog, providing water, and exercising the dog.
- After Sadler departed, Philip and his sister returned to the home and let the dog out into the backyard to play.
- While the dog was running and playing, it collided with Philip and knocked him down.
- Philip allegedly suffered serious, permanent injuries.
- Philip’s father, David B. Docherty, sued Sadler on Philip’s behalf (and also individually), seeking recovery under the Illinois Animal Control Act (ACA), which imposes liability on an animal’s “owner” when, without provocation, the animal “attacks or injures” a person who is peaceably and lawfully present.
- Sadler moved to dismiss, arguing Philip was an “owner” under the ACA because Philip had the dog “in his care” and was acting as its custodian during Sadler’s absence.
- The circuit court dismissed the ACA claim with prejudice, concluding Philip’s caretaker relationship placed him outside the statute’s protected class.

## Issues

1. Whether a minor who agreed to feed, water, and exercise a neighbor’s dog while the neighbor was away had the dog “in his care” or acted as its “custodian,” making him an “owner” under the Illinois Animal Control Act.
2. Whether the minor’s claimed lack of awareness of the risk (framed as an assumption-of-risk argument) prevented treating him as an “owner” for purposes of the Act and allowed him to recover statutory damages.

## Decision

- The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the dismissal with prejudice.
- Philip qualified as an “owner” under the ACA’s broad definition because he accepted responsibility for the dog and was caring for it (feeding, watering, and exercising it) while Sadler was out of town.
- Because the ACA’s strict-liability remedy in section 16 imposes liability on an “owner” in favor of an injured “person,” a plaintiff who fits the statute’s definition of “owner” is not within the class of persons the Act protects for this remedy.
- Plaintiffs’ contention that Philip could not have appreciated or knowingly assumed the risk did not alter the statutory analysis: the controlling question was Philip’s relationship to the dog (care/custody), not his subjective understanding of potential harm.

## Legal Principles

- Under the Illinois Animal Control Act, “owner” includes not only the title holder, but also any person who “has [the dog] in his care” or “acts as its custodian,” even for a short period.
- A person who meets the Act’s definition of “owner” is not a statutory plaintiff under section 16 for injuries caused by that animal; the strict-liability remedy is for non-owners injured without provocation while peaceably and lawfully present.
- Whether an injured caretaker actually anticipated the specific manner of injury does not control the “owner” determination; the statute focuses on the objective caretaker/custodian role.
- The Act does not create a general exception for minors from the definition of “owner” when the minor has accepted and is performing caretaking duties.

## Conclusion

Because Philip accepted and performed caretaking responsibilities for Sadler’s dog while Sadler was away, Philip had the dog “in his care” and acted as its custodian, making him an “owner” under the Illinois Animal Control Act; as an owner, he was outside the class entitled to sue under the Act’s strict-liability provision, so dismissal with prejudice was properly affirmed.


Docherty v. Sadler, 689 N.E.2d 332 (1997)