## Facts

- Three plaintiffs, minors at the relevant times, alleged they were sex-trafficked and that their exploitation was advertised in postings on Backpage.com’s “Adult Services” section.
- Backpage operated an online classified-ad platform that hosted user-generated advertisements in categorized sections.
- Plaintiffs alleged traffickers created and posted the ads; the complaint did not allege Backpage authored the ads’ text or produced the photographs.
- Plaintiffs alleged Backpage’s site structure and business practices made trafficking ads easier to post and more effective, including adult-oriented categories, allowance of erotic images, and moderation practices that removed some explicit terms while permitting coded listings.
- Plaintiffs asserted state-law civil claims, including negligence and claims under the Massachusetts Trafficking Victims Protection Act, seeking to hold Backpage liable for their exploitation.
- The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), holding the claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.
- Plaintiffs appealed from the dismissal.

## Issues

1. Whether 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) immunizes Backpage from state-law claims premised on third-party sex-trafficking advertisements hosted on its site.
2. Whether Backpage’s design choices and content-moderation practices rendered it an “information content provider” of the unlawful ads, removing § 230 immunity.
3. Whether § 230’s policy statements or statutory exceptions permit state civil trafficking-related claims against a website hosting third-party postings.

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint.
- Backpage qualified as an “interactive computer service” within the meaning of § 230.
- Plaintiffs’ theories sought to hold Backpage liable for decisions about publishing, organizing, and screening third-party content, which falls within § 230(c)(1)’s protection.
- Allegations about categories, site design, and moderation did not plausibly allege Backpage created or developed the specific unlawful content in the ads.
- The court declined to recognize a judicially created trafficking exception to § 230 where the statute’s enumerated exceptions did not cover the asserted state-law claims.

## Legal Principles

- Under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), an interactive computer service may not be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content provider.
- Claims framed as negligence or other state-law theories are barred when they, in substance, impose liability for publishing functions such as deciding whether, where, and how to display third-party content.
- A website loses § 230 protection only if it is responsible, in whole or in part, for creating or developing the specific information that is unlawful; providing categories, tools, or editorial screening—without materially contributing to the content’s illegality—does not suffice.
- Statutory policy statements cannot override the operative immunity text, and courts may not add exceptions beyond those Congress enacted in § 230(e).

## Conclusion

The First Circuit held that § 230 barred the minors’ state-law claims because they depended on treating Backpage as the publisher of third-party trafficking advertisements, and the alleged site design and moderation practices did not make Backpage a developer of the ads’ unlawful content.


Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016)