## Facts

- A pregnant Georgia woman using the pseudonym “Mary Doe” sought an abortion but was denied because she did not satisfy Georgia’s statutory grounds.
- Georgia law allowed abortion only if a physician, in “best clinical judgment,” found one of three conditions: threat to the woman’s life or health, likely serious fetal defect, or pregnancy from rape.
- The law also imposed procedural conditions: performance only in a hospital accredited by a specified hospital accreditor, approval by a hospital abortion committee, and written concurrence by two additional licensed physicians.
- The law restricted lawful abortions to Georgia residents.
- Plaintiffs included Doe, Georgia-licensed physicians, and other health and religious professionals; defendants included the Georgia Attorney General and other state officials.
- A three-judge federal district court invalidated the statute’s substantive limitation to the three grounds but upheld the procedural conditions; plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

## Issues

1. Whether the case was justiciable and whether Doe and physician plaintiffs had standing despite the time-limited nature of pregnancy.
2. Whether the “best clinical judgment” standard was unconstitutionally vague.
3. Whether the law’s procedural requirements (accredited-hospital requirement, committee approval, and two-physician concurrence) violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Whether the residency restriction violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held Doe’s claim was not moot and that Doe had standing because pregnancy is capable of repetition yet evading review.
- The Court held physician plaintiffs had standing due to threatened criminal sanctions and interference with medical practice.
- The Court upheld the “best clinical judgment” language against a vagueness challenge.
- The Court invalidated the accredited-hospital requirement, hospital committee approval requirement, and two-physician concurrence requirement as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The Court invalidated the residency requirement under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
- The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

## Legal Principles

- Pregnancy-related challenges may remain justiciable under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness.
- Physicians may have standing to challenge abortion regulations that threaten prosecution and chill medical judgment.
- A statutory standard tied to a physician’s “best clinical judgment” may be sufficiently definite to satisfy due process vagueness limits.
- States may not impose abortion-specific procedural hurdles—such as mandatory accredited-hospital performance, special committee permission, or multiple-physician concurrence—when they unduly burden the abortion decision and intrude on the physician–patient relationship without adequate justification.
- A state may not restrict access to lawful abortion services to its own residents; such discrimination against nonresidents violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

## Conclusion

The Court substantially struck down Georgia’s abortion statute by invalidating its hospital accreditation, committee-approval, multi-physician concurrence, and residency requirements, while sustaining the statute’s “best clinical judgment” standard and confirming standing for the pregnant plaintiff and physicians to challenge the law.


Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)