## Facts

- John Doe alleged that, as a minor Boy Scout in Connecticut in the mid-1970s, he was sexually abused on three occasions during scouting activities by his patrol leader, Siegfried Hepp, who was about three years older.
- Doe sued the Boy Scouts of America Corporation (BSA) on theories including negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, recklessness, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).
- A central theory was that BSA knew or should have known of the risk of sexual abuse in scouting and failed to implement reasonable preventive measures, causing Doe’s injuries.
- At trial, BSA requested a jury instruction reflecting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B: a defendant is generally not liable for failing to prevent a third party’s intentional criminal act unless the defendant’s own conduct created or increased the risk of that act.
- The trial court declined BSA’s requested “created or increased the risk” language and instead gave a standard negligence instruction.
- The jury found for Doe on all claims and awarded damages exceeding $11 million; the trial court rendered judgment and denied BSA’s postverdict motions.
- BSA appealed, challenging the jury instructions and other rulings, including limitations issues and aspects of liability and damages.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that BSA could be liable for the patrol leader’s intentional sexual abuse only if BSA’s own conduct created or increased the risk of that abuse.
2. What causal connection must be found between alleged institutional negligence and intentional criminal harm by a third party, and how that requirement must be communicated to the jury.
3. Whether the thirty-year childhood sexual abuse limitations period applies to claims against a nonperpetrator institutional defendant when the injuries are alleged to have been caused by sexual abuse.

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
- The trial court was required to instruct, in substance, that BSA could not be held liable for the patrol leader’s intentional sexual misconduct unless BSA’s conduct created or increased the risk that the abuse would occur.
- The refusal to give that limiting instruction was harmful error because the Court could not determine that the jury would have reached the same verdict under a proper charge.
- The Court concluded that the thirty-year limitations period for injuries to minors caused by sexual abuse applied to the plaintiff’s claims, even though they were pleaded against BSA under negligence and related theories rather than against the direct perpetrator.
- A partial dissent would have found any instructional error harmless and would have affirmed the trial court’s handling of damages; a separate disagreement persisted regarding the limitations analysis, but reconsideration was denied.

## Legal Principles

- In negligence actions seeking to hold a defendant liable for harm caused by a third party’s intentional or criminal misconduct, the defendant is generally not liable unless the defendant’s own conduct created or increased the risk of that misconduct (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B).
- A standard negligence instruction may be inadequate in third-party intentional-act cases if it omits the requirement that the defendant’s conduct must have created or increased the risk of the third party’s wrongdoing.
- Refusal to give a properly requested, legally correct instruction central to the theory of liability is reversible error when the appellate court cannot say the verdict would necessarily have been the same under a correct instruction.
- Connecticut’s thirty-year statute of limitations for actions for personal injury to a minor caused by sexual abuse applies broadly to claims alleging injuries caused by sexual abuse, including claims against institutional defendants pleaded in negligence and related tort theories.

## Conclusion

The Connecticut Supreme Court ordered a new trial because the jury was not instructed that BSA’s negligence liability for a patrol leader’s intentional sexual abuse required proof that BSA’s own conduct created or increased the risk of that abuse, and the instructional omission was not harmless; the Court also applied the thirty-year childhood sexual abuse limitations period to the claims.


Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am. Corp., 323 Conn. 303 (2016)