## Facts

- Jane Doe worked as a graphic artist for C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc.; her direct supervisor was vice president and part-owner Fred Kohl.
- Doe became pregnant and informed Kohl; she sought flexibility to make up time for medical appointments.
- After abnormal pregnancy-related test results, Doe missed work for additional testing; communications to management indicated her absence was pregnancy-related.
- Doe’s husband told Kohl that Doe would undergo a surgical abortion due to fetal abnormalities and requested about one week of vacation.
- The abortion occurred on August 11, 2000; a funeral was held August 16.
- On August 16, Doe learned she was terminated.
- The employer asserted Doe was fired for violating a policy requiring employees to call in each day they were absent.
- Doe offered evidence that Kohl knew she would be out about a week, that others were not fired for similar call-in lapses, and that the termination closely followed the abortion.

## Issues

1. Whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s prohibition on discrimination based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” includes an employee’s abortion.
2. Whether the evidence, viewed in Doe’s favor, was sufficient under the McDonnell Douglas framework to establish an inference of discrimination and a triable issue of pretext, making summary judgment improper.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit held that abortion is a “related medical condition” protected by Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
- The court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the employer and remanded.
- The court concluded a reasonable jury could infer discriminatory intent from the short timing between the abortion and termination, employer knowledge of the reason for leave, and evidence of uneven enforcement of the call-in policy.

## Legal Principles

- Title VII’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibits adverse employment actions because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, including an employee’s decision to have an abortion.
- On summary judgment, evidence must be viewed in the nonmovant’s favor; the employer, as movant, must show no reasonable jury could find for the employee.
- Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may survive summary judgment by producing evidence supporting an inference of discrimination and evidence that the employer’s stated reason is not credible, including comparator evidence and suspicious timing.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit recognized abortion as a protected pregnancy-related medical condition under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and held that evidence of employer knowledge, unequal policy enforcement, and close temporal proximity between the abortion and termination could permit a jury to find discrimination, requiring reversal of summary judgment.


Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008)