Doe v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 106 P.3d 743 (2004)

Facts

  • Jane Doe and her minor son, John Doe, attended the same LDS congregation as George Tilson.
  • Tilson served as a scout leader in a church-sponsored troop and held the title “high priest,” a church designation signaling moral standing and trustworthiness.
  • In 1976, when Jane was 13 years old, Tilson allegedly lured her into his home and fondled her.
  • Between 1993 and 1996, Tilson allegedly lured John into his home from a neighbor’s yard and sexually abused him.
  • In 2001, Jane learned through news reports that the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (COP) may have known about Tilson’s prior child abuse before the alleged abuse of Jane and John.
  • Jane and John sued COP, alleging COP negligently failed to warn Jane about Tilson’s prior bad acts and dangerous propensities.
  • The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiffs appealed.

Issues

  1. Whether COP owed the plaintiffs a common-law duty to warn or protect them from Tilson’s criminal acts absent a special relationship between COP and Tilson or between COP and the plaintiffs.
  2. Whether Tilson’s church roles (including scout leader and “high priest”) were enough to create a duty by COP to warn congregation members about Tilson’s alleged prior abuse.

Decision

  • The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint.
  • The court held COP owed no duty to warn or protect the plaintiffs from Tilson’s abuse because COP did not have a legally recognized special relationship with Tilson or with the plaintiffs that would impose an affirmative duty to act.
  • The court rejected the argument that Tilson’s church titles and volunteer activities, standing alone, created the type of relationship that gives an organization a duty to control a third party or protect potential victims.
  • A negligence claim requires the existence of a legal duty; absent a duty, there is no negligence liability.
  • As a general rule, a person or entity has no affirmative duty to control a third party’s conduct or to protect another from third-party criminal acts.
  • An affirmative duty to warn or protect may arise only when a recognized special relationship exists between the defendant and the wrongdoer or the defendant and the victim, typically involving custody, dependency, or a right to control.
  • A religious organization’s relationship with a congregant, and a congregant’s religious or volunteer status within the congregation, does not by itself create the special-relationship duty necessary to require warnings about the congregant’s alleged dangerous propensities.

Conclusion

Because COP lacked a special relationship with either Tilson or the plaintiffs that would impose an affirmative duty to warn or protect against Tilson’s criminal acts, the court held the plaintiffs’ negligent failure-to-warn theory did not state a legally cognizable duty, and dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.